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SEC V. JERRY T O'BRIEN, INC.: HAS THE
SUPREME COURT OVERRULED UNITED
STATES V. POWELL?
Therese Maynard*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission' "must be free without
undue interference or delay to conduct an investigation which will ade-
quately develop a factual basis for a determination as to whether particu-
lar activities"2 fall within the SEC's regulatory authority. Although the
SEC has a legitimate interest in taking the steps necessary to see that
there is compliance with the federal securities laws, "it is not at liberty to
act unreasonably, and in appropriate circumstances the court may in-
quire into the reasons for an investigation and into its effects." 3 In the
past, the courts have recognized that the target4 of an SEC administra-
tive investigation has legitimate personal and business interests that may
be jeopardized or even severely damaged as a result of the mere pendency
of an SEC investigation.5 Thus, in any given SEC investigation, a tension
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California; B.A. 1978, Univer-
sity of California, Irvine; J.D. 1981, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to
thank Katy Basile, Loyola Law School, 1986, for her assistance in researching this Article.
Copyright, 1985 by Therese Maynard.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the SEC or the Commission.
2. SEC v. Brigadon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1974).
3. Id. at 1056; see also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979).
4. The term "target" is not defined in the federal securities laws or in the SEC rules
promulgated thereunder. The term is generally understood, however, to refer to the "persons
who are being investigated" by the SEC. SECURITIES REGULATION 1232 (R. Jennings & H.
Marsh 5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Jennings & Marsh]. See also SEC v. Nat'l Student
Mktg. Corp., 538 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (McGowan, J., dissenting) (Justice Mc-
Gowan referred to "persons who were the targets of [SEC] staff investigations," and again to
"the necessary step of notifying investigation targets of the nature of the violations involved"),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. v. SEC, 714 F.2d 923, 923-24
(9th Cir. 1983) (The court stated that the SEC was "conducting a formal, administrative inves-
tigation of Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. (Wedbush). . . concern[ing] suspected violations of
the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities laws by Wedbush and its
customers.. . . No notice of these [SEC third party administrative] subpoenas was given
directly to Wedbush, the target of the investigation.").
5. Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedures, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 435
(1977); Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747, 751-52 (D. Mont. 1980).
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between the competing interests of the SEC and the target will be ever
present, and the dilemma is to assure that an appropriate balance be-
tween these interests is reached at every stage of SEC investigative
proceedings.6
In its recent decision in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.,' the United
States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the target of an
SEC investigation is entitled to receive notice of third party subpoenas
issued by the SEC. The Court held that no constitutional, statutory or
decisional authority justified imposing such a notice requirement on the
SEC. Although the result is clear, the Court's reasoning casts doubt on
the continued validity and proper application of the principles of United
States v. Powell,8 which formed the basis of the target's claim to a notice
requirement. The implications of the Court's rather cursory and cryptic
treatment of the target's reliance on Powell potentially apply to not only
SEC investigations but also to those of all other federal administrative
agencies.
To give the reader a context in which to evaluate the proper balance
between the inherently conflicting interests of the target and the SEC,
this Article first summarizes the general nature of SEC investigative pro-
ceedings. Next, an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
O'Brien will illustrate the flaws in the Court's treatment of the notice
problem and its failure to address adequately these conflicting interests.
6. This potential conflict between the competing interets of the target and the administra-
tive agency has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. One of the earliest Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the issue of judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas
recognized that targets of administrative agencies may undertake measures to "stop much if
not all. . . investigation in the public interest at the threshold of the inquiry. . . . This
would render substantially impossible [the] effective discharge of the duties of investigation
and enforcement which Congress has placed upon [the administrative agency]." Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946). In his dissent, in Oklahoma Press,
Justice Murphy articulated the countervailing interests of the administrative target:
Administrative law has increased greatly in the past few years and seems des-
tined to be augmented even further in the future. But attending this growth should
be a new and broader sense of responsibility on the part of administrative agencies
and officials. Excessive use or abuse of authority can not only destroy man's instinct
for liberty but will eventually undo the administrative processes themselves.
Perhaps we are too far removed from the experiences of the past to appreciate
fully the consequences that may result from an irresponsible though well-meaning
use of the subpoena power. To allow a non-judicial officer, unarmed with judicial
process, to demand the books and papers of an individual is an open invitation to
abuse of that power.
Id. at 218-19 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).
8. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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Finally, this Article will propose legislation to provide a proper balance
between the competing needs of the SEC and the target.
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF THE TARGET AND THE SEC IN
A FORMAL INVESTIGATION
The SEC must be provided with the necessary tools to carry out its
enforcement responsibilities under the federal securities laws,9 which
were enacted for the protection of the investing public. ° But those pow-
erful tools that have been given to the SEC to carry out its mandate,
including the subpoena power 1 and the power to impose significant
sanctions on the target,12 are subject to potential abuse and may severely
damage, without appropriate justification, the interests of the target of an
investigation. In its O'Brien decision, the Supreme Court accepted the
SEC's position that requiring notice to the target of third party subpoe-
nas would impose an undue burden on the SEC's ability to carry out its
enforcement responsibilities. What the Court failed to consider fully,
however, are the legitimate concerns of a person who becomes the target
of an SEC administrative investigation.
The "investigative" nature of the SEC administrative proceedings is
generally given as at least a partial justification for denying the target
certain rights such as notice of matters under investigation, the right to
cross-examine witnesses and now, presumably, the right to receive notice
of third party subpoenas.13 What this argument overlooks completely,
however, is that the target suffers prejudicial publicity from the mere
issuance of an SEC subpoena to a third party. 14 The third party witness
9. The six acts administered by the SEC, which comprise that body of law commonly
referred to as the "federal securities laws," are as follows: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
1-80a-52 (1982); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982); see also Preamble to Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74
(1933).
11. See infra note 27.
12. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
13. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446-47, 451 (1960); E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, FED-
ERAL SECURITIES HANDBOOK 221, 225-26 (4th ed. 1977).
14. See Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46 FORDHAM L REV.
435 (1977); Lowenfels, SEC Investigations: The Need for Reform, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 575,
576-77 (1971). A study commissioned by the SEC reported that "[i]nvestigations are often
protracted and their existence frequently becomes a matter of public knowledge. During the
pendency of an investigation uncertainties are likely to be created in the minds of the investi-
gatees and those with whom they have business or other dealings. REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1972),
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may receive a subpoena and be apprised of the violations that the target
is suspected to have committed' 5 and all the while the target is unaware
of these events. 6 The securities industry is exceptional in its reliance on
confidence-based business relationships. 7 The foundation of these busi-
ness relationships, which are so important to the target's continued liveli-
hood in the securities industry, may be irreparably harmed by the SEC's
conduct of its investigation through administrative summonses issued to
the target's business acquaintances without notice to the target. 18
This policy basis for a notice requirement, involving "real world"
concerns of negative publicity to the target, was not expressly considered
by the Supreme Court in its O'Brien decision. Notwithstanding this
omission, this consideration should be balanced against the SEC's policy
arguments, which did form the primary basis for the Court's decision in
O'Brien, so that a proper balance may be reached between the competing
interests of the SEC and the targets of SEC administrative investigations.
A. SEC Administrative Investigations and Use of Its Subpoena Power
Congress has delegated to the SEC broad authority to conduct in-
vestigations into suspected violations of the federal securities laws."9 The
Commission generally initiates an investigation as a result of: (1) a com-
plaint of an investor or other member of the general public; (2) a surprise
inspection of the books and records to be maintained by a securities in-
dustry professional; or (3) the SEC's general surveillance and analysis of
the performance of particular stocks within the marketplace where fluc-
tuations cannot be explained by known developments relating to the is-
reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 158, at 7 (June 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
The Wells Committee Report].
15. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
17. See Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 578; Lacy, supra note 14, at 435.
18. "Settlement [of SEC investigations] is also desirable from [the target's] point of view,
because, apart from the costs and expenditure of time involved, a prolonged proceeding is
likely to result in repeated adverse publicity and may have other undesirable and, possibly,
unintended effects." The Wells Committee Report, supra note 14, at 10; see also Lacy, supra
note 14, at 435-36, 438-39; Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 576; Freedman, A Civil Libertarian
Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 280, 284 (1974); Freeman, A Private Practi-
tioner's View of the Development of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 18, 24 (1959).
19. Congress has delegated broad power to the SEC to conduct administrative investiga-
tions into suspected violations of the federal securities laws: 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1982) (Securi-
ties Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982) (Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(a) (1982)
(Public Utility Holding Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1982) (Trust Indenture Act); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-41(a) (1982) (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(a) (1982) (Invest-
ment Advisors Act).
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suer or the marketplace as a whole.20
Generally, the first phase of an investigation is conducted in an in-
formal manner.21 The SEC interviews actors involved in the suspected
wrongdoing and prospective witnesses, and examines related books and
records on a voluntary consent basis22 to uncover further facts and to
determine if there is a factual basis to support the SEC's suspicion that a
provision of the federal securities laws, or the rules of a self-regulatory
organization, have been, or are about to be, violated.23 These interviews
and examinations are non-public and any reports generated during the
course of such proceedings are for the SEC's use only.24
Once the informal phase of its investigation is completed, the SEC
staff reviews the accumulated evidence and decides whether to request
the Commission members to issue a Formal Order of Investigation.25 An
FOI serves as the basis for a formal investigation and, by its terms, de-
fines the scope of the investigation.
2 6
As part of its investigative authority, the SEC is empowered to issue
administrative subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documents determined by the SEC to be relevant to the
investigation.27 This subpoena power attaches only when an FOI is en-
20. See SEC Rule 202.5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1984); SEcuarrEs EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION, The Work of the SEC, reprinted in Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 29 [hereinafter
cited as The Work of the SEC].
21. Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231.
22. SEC Rule 202.5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1984). This rule makes clear that no admin-
istrative process may be issued during the informal phase of an SEC investigation. At this
stage, "no one is required to talk to the [SEC] investigators if he does not wish to do so."
Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231; see also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018,
1021 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); Merrifield, Investigations by the
SEC, 32 Bus. LAW. 1583, 1595 (1977).
23. SEC Rule 202.5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1984).
24. Id.
25. Id.; Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231; Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1598. Here-
inafter, Formal Order of Investigation will be referred to as FOI. Once the Commission has
entered an FOI, the investigation proceeds in accordance with the SEC's Rules Relating to
Investigation. See infra note 31.
26. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1066 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1023, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979). See generally SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d
118 (3d Cir. 1981); Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1598-99.
27. In connection with any investigations that are deemed necessary by the Commission
members, Congress has authorized the Commission members, or any officer designated by
them, to issue administrative process. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1982) (Securities Act); 15
U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982) (Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1982) (Public Utility
Holding Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1982) (Trust Indenture Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
41(b) (1982) (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1982) (Investment Advisors
Act).
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tered by the Commission members.2" As part of an FOI the Commission
members customarily delegate to certain staff members the authority to
issue administrative subpoenas.29 As a general rule, the staff member
who conducted the informal investigation also seeks the entry of the FOI
and is usually the person to whom the Commission delegates its sub-
poena power.3° Pursuant to the legislative delegation of investigative
power, the SEC has drafted rules that govern the manner in which an
investigation will proceed.31
The target of an SEC administrative investigation is not required to
receive notification of the entry of an FOI.32  Usually, the target first
becomes aware of the existence of an SEC investigation when the target
receives an SEC subpoena to produce documents or to testify.33 Alterna-
tively, the target may receive informal notice from a third party who has
received an SEC subpoena.34
All proceedings conducted pursuant to an FOI are private, unless
the Commission members have specifically ordered that the investigation
be a matter of public record.35 The general policy behind the non-public
nature of SEC investigations recognizes that the target, as well as any
third party witnesses whose participation is required in the SEC investi-
28. SEC Rule 202.5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1984); Rules Relating to Investigations
203.8, 17 C.F.R. § 203.8 (1984); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979).
29. Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231; Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1599; SEC v.
Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 1071
(1979).
30. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 222; Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 577.
31. SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations are codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-203.8 (1984).
The Rules Relating to Investigations, which apply only to the formal investigative phase of
SEC proceedings, are to be distinguished from the SEC's more general Rules of Practice,
which are codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-201.60 (1984). The Rules of Practice apply to all
proceedings initiated by and conducted before the Commission. For an excellent description
of SEC investigations in general and the operation of these SEC Rules, see Tew & Freedman,
Practice in Securities and Exchange Commission Investigatory and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings,
27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1972); Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1583; Winter, Representing Wit-
nesses in SEC Formal Investigations, 5 LITIGATION 24 (1979).
32. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 222; L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1949-50 (1961).
33. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 222; Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1599.
34. During oral argument before the Supreme Court in the O'Brien case, Justice Stevens
suggested that targets "[o]nly do business with people willing to give notice. . . ." Supreme
Court Hears Arguments in SEC Third-Party Subpoena Case, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
665, 667 (1984). See also Lacy, supra note 14, at 438; Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1599.
35. Rules Relating to Investigations 203.2 and 203.5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 203.2, 203.5 (1984).
The informal phase of an SEC investigation also is a non-public matter unless it is specifically
made a matter of public record by order of the Commission members. See SEC Rule 202.5, 17
C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1984); Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1600.
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gation, may be "seriously injured if it became publicized that they were
somehow involved in [an SEC] investigation."36 It is also the SEC's be-
lief that a private investigation promotes cooperation and candor from
potential participants since they can be assured that their testimony will
remain confidential.37
If a recipient of an SEC administrative subpoena believes that the
summons is defective or is otherwise subject to challenge, the recipient
may simply refuse to comply with the administrative subpoena.38 No
penalty will attach for this failure to comply since the SEC subpoena is
not self-executing.39 Many recipients, however, fail to realize that an
SEC subpoena is not self-enforcing. 4 This is due at least in part to the
air of authority that surrounds an administrative subpoena and the pro-
cedure by which it is issued.4' Indeed, the text of an SEC subpoena duces
tecum includes the following warning to its recipient: "Fail not at your
peril."
'42
Although Congress delegated subpoena power to the Commission,
36. Tew & Freedman, supra note 31, at 7.
37. Id.
38. Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S.
357, 363-64 (1942) ("Where can be no penalty incurred for contempt [for failure to comply
with an administrative subpoena] before there is a judicial order for enforcement.").
39. O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1984) ("Subpoenas issued by the [SEC] are not self-
enforcing, and the recipients thereof are not subject to penalty for refusal to obey.").
40. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984).
41. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("Many persons have yielded [to an administrative subpoena] solely because of the
air of authority with which the demand is made, a demand that cannot be enforced without
subsequent judicial aid."); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1942) (The
administrative subpoena "has some coercive tendency, either because of ignorance of their
rights on the part of those whom its purports to command on their natural respect for what
appears to be an official command, or because of their reluctance to test the subpoena's validity
by litigation.").
42. The SEC subpoena which was served during the course of the SEC's O'Brien investiga-
tion contained the customary warning, "Fail not at your peril." Although a subpoena recipient
has the option of refusing to comply with a subpoena that the recipient believes is defective and
thus forcing the SEC to test the validity of the subpoena in a judicial enforcement action,
rarely do subpoena recipients exercise this option. Instead they choose to cooperate in the face
of the severe reprisals that may otherwise befall the subpoena recipient. It has been suggested
that refusal to obey an SEC subpoena
is rarely advisable, since it will infuriate the SEC staff, and they are likely to make life
as unpleasant as possible to the person involved during the subsequent course of the
proceeding. It may even result in that person being named as a defendant in an
injunction action or in a criminal reference to the Justice Department, which might
not have occurred if he had been cooperative.
Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231-32.
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Congress did not intend these subpoenas to be self-enforcing.43 If a re-
cipient of an administrative subpoena issued by the SEC refuses to com-
ply, the SEC may compel compliance only by instituting an enforcement
action in the appropriate district court. 4 Under this legislative scheme,
a person cannot be punished for failure to comply with an administrative
subpoena until its terms have been reviewed by a district court4 s and the
court has entered an order directing compliance with the terms of the
subpoena as originally issued or as modified by the court.46
The target of an SEC investigation does not receive a copy of the
FOI;4 7 however, if the target receives an SEC subpoena, the target may
exercise the right accorded a witness in a formal investigation to ex-
amine, upon proper request, a copy of the FOI.48 No copies of the FOI,
however, may be retained by the target or any other subpoena recipient,
unless unusual circumstances can be shown.49 Review of the FOI by
counsel prior to the target's compliance with the subpoena is important,
not merely to enlighten the target as to the nature of the SEC's suspicions
of wrongdoing, but also to determine whether any document requested
or the testimony to be given is within the scope of the FOIO°
If the target is not subpoenaed by the SEC, the target may be made
43. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1982) (Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982) (Securi-
ties Exchange Act).
44. Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1602 ("If a subpoenad witness does not wish to comply
with the subpoena he may refuse to appear and thereby force the staff to apply to the federal
district court for an order compelling compliance."). See also supra note 27 & 43.
45. Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1231 ("There is no punishment provided for ignor-
ing such a subpoena [issued by the SEC staff]. If a witness refuses to appear or refuses to
answer questions, the only recourse of the Commission is to initiate a proceeding in court to
enforce compliance with the subpoena.").
46. With respect to the court's authority to modify the terms of an administrative sub-
poena before ordering compliance, see, SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (court ordered defendant's compliance with SEC's third party subpoena but conditioned
subpoena enforcement by modifying terms of original subpoena so as to avoid excessive burden
to subpoena recipient), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S.
141, 146 (1975) ("The cases show that the federal courts have taken seriously their obligation
to apply [the Powell] standard to fit particular situations, either by refusing enforcement or
narrowing the scope of the summons."); Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir.) ("[T]he
court has the power to condition enforcement [of administrative process] upon observance of
safeguards to the [target's] valid interests."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980); SEC v. Csapo,
533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (enforcement of an SEC administrative subpoena was conditioned
on the subpoena recipient's right to be represented at his deposition by the attorneys of his
choice, notwithstanding the SEC's claim that it had the authority to exclude the attorneys).
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48. Rule Relating to Investigations 203.7(a), 17 C.F.R. 203.7(a) (1984); Tew & Freedman,
supra note 31, at 8.
49. Rule Relating to Investigations 203.7(a), 17 C.F.R. 203.7(a) (1984).
50. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 222; Winter, supra note 31, at 25.
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aware of a pending SEC investigation by a third party who receives an
SEC summons issued as part of the SEC's investigation of the target.51
That third party also has the right to inspect the FOI 2 Frequently,
however, the third party has no incentive to inspect the FOI to ascertain
whether the subpoena is within the scope of the FOI, presuming, of
course, that the third party is even aware of this right.53
The target does not receive notice of the SEC subpoena issued to a
third party. 4 As a result, the target is unable to contact the third party
to explain that the pending proceedings are investigatory only, notwith-
standing the compelling and accusatory nature of the SEC administrative
subpoena and FOI.55 Oftentimes, the third party is a business associate
of the target.56 These contacts between the SEC and the third party,
unbeknownst to the target, at the very least besmirch the reputation of
the target and can have potentially disastrous consequences to the tar-
get's business relationships and ultimately to his or her ability to engage
in the financial markets. 7
51. See supra note 34.
52. See supra note 48.
53. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984). There may even be a disincentive for the third party subpoena recipient to under-
take any such evaluation of the proper scope of subpoena request, due at least in part to the
legitimate concern that the witness' ongoing relationship with the SEC, as part of its usual
business activities, may be made more difficult. See supra note 41; Lacy, supra note 14, at 435
("Persons subject to SEC regulation must strive for its favor, because they are confronted with
regulations administered by it at every turn, and because the agency has broad discretion in
administering those legal requirements."). Moreover, in United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
644 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1981), the court noted that Congress recognized that, prior to the adop-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code § 7609 in the context of Internal Revenue Service taxpayer
investigations, third party subpoena recipients had the right to challenge IRS subpoenas on a
variety of grounds, including relevance, but Congress further recognized that "the interest of
the third party witness in protecting the privacy of the records in question is frequently far less
intense than that of the person to whom the records pertain." Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
Since the Powell criteria relate to the target's interests more than the third party's personal
interests, this reasoning applies with equal force to the SEC third party subpoena notice issue.
See O'Brien v. SEC, 704 F.2d at 1068-69.
54. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2720, 2725 (1984).
55. See supra note 41-42.
56. The SEC is empowered to investigate suspected violations of federal securities law
violations. Generally, the SEC institutes these investigations because of referrals relating to
particular persons or transactions. Thus, the general starting point of most SEC investigations
involves examining persons or records related to the subject transaction or person under inves-
tigation and this generally requires direct contact by the SEC with the target's business associ-
ates. See Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 577-78; Lacy, supra note 14, at 435, 438-39.
57. SEC v. Brigadon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1974). In Brigadoon Scotch, the court stated:
To avoid "an unnecessary imposition on [the targets]" that "possibly would damage
their business" [the district court] denied enforcement [of a certain portion of the
SEC's administrative subpoenas] . . . . In addition, to lessen the impact on [the
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Lacking notice of the SEC third party subpoena, the target is also
denied the chance to explain to the third person the basis of the target's
denial of the SEC charges under investigation, so that the target may
preserve and hold the third party's business confidence.5 8 Indeed, during
the course of a formal SEC investigation, the target has little ability to
marshall any evidence in his or her defense, that is, no ability to attend
third party depositions and examine witnesses,59 limited ability for coun-
sel to question or rehabilitate the target at the target's deposition,60 and
limited ability for counsel to object to questions posed by SEC investiga-
tors at the target's deposition.6" As one commentator has observed,
"[b]ecause of the investigative nature of the proceeding, counsel does not
have the right to present the [target's] 'case' by calling witnesses or intro-
ducing documents into evidence.",
62
The formal phase of the SEC's investigative proceedings conducted
pursuant to an FOI generally resolves itself in one of the following ways:
(1) the SEC staff may initiate administrative proceedings before the Com-
mission seeking administrative sanctions authorized by statute;63 (2) the
SEC staff may initiate injunctive actions in federal district court;6 (3) the
SEC staff may refer matters to the Department of Justice for considera-
tion of criminal prosecution if the evidence suggests willful violations;6"
targets'] business which might result from inquiries ...directed to [the targets]
customers and employees.. . [the district court] also provided that appropriate pro-
tective provisions should be entered in the final order [enforcing the SEC's
subpoena].
Id.; See also Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 576-77; Merrifield, supra note 22, at 1594; Freedman,
supra note 18, at 284; Lacy, supra note 14, at 438-39 ("The first group to learn of the investiga-
tion is typically made up of those with whom the target does business, who are the most
promising witnesses, yet whose knowledge of the inquiry is the most damaging to the target.")
(footnote omitted).
58. Lacy, supra note 14, at 435 ("[Tihose subject to SEC regulation will avoid association
with targets of the agency's suspicions.").
59. Jennings & Marsh, supra note 4, at 1232; Tew & Freedman, supra note 31, at 8.
60. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 226.
61. Id. at 225-26 ("Because of the relatively free-wheeling nature of the proceedings, the
role of counsel is somewhat limited."); Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 579-80 ("The investigatory
stage . . . is much more free-wheeling. The rights of the investigatee are not protected by
written rules and regulations as much as by the good judgment, discretion, innate decency and
fairness of the staff members conducting the investigation.").
62. E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra note 13, at 225-26 (emphasis added). The authors do
point out, however, that the target may suggest to the SEC other potential witnesses and
sources of documents and may request the SEC to accept documents and/or statements rele-
vant to the subject matter of the investigation. The SEC has the discretion whether to pursue
any of these suggestions. Id. at 225-27.
63. SEC Rule 202.5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1984); The Work of the SEC, supra note 20,
at 30.
64. SEC Rule 202.5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1984).
65. Id.
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(4) the SEC staff may settle the dispute with the target before any further
enforcement proceedings are instituted;66 or (5) the SEC staff may let the
matter die,67 generally because the investigation failed to disclose suffi-
cient facts to support any allegation of a violation of the federal securities
laws. In the event that the SEC staff declines to recommend the com-
mencement of enforcement proceedings against a target, the staff, "in its
discretion, may advise the [target] that its formal investigation has been
terminated."6 Thus, the SEC need not advise a target that it has com-
pleted its inquiry into the target's activities and has decided to take no
further action.69 The SEC is under no obligation to notify recipients of
third party subpoenas that the SEC's investigation has been terminated
with no further proceedings to be taken. Moreover, the target has not
received notice of the process served by the SEC on third parties and
cannot notify them of the resolution of the SEC's investigation unless
informal notice was received from the third parties themselves.7 °
B. The Interests of the Target that Support a Notice Requirement in
the Context of SEC Administrative Investigations
It is generally acknowledged that those persons who are known to
be connected with an SEC investigation suffer a 'taint" that can have
potentially disastrous consequences to such persons' ability to earn a live-
lihood within the securities industry.71 This negative publicity flows
66. SEC Rule 202.5(f), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (1984); see E. THOMAS & R. SHIELDS, supra
note 13, at 228-29 (regarding settlement practices in general); Rules of Practice 201.8(a), 17
C.F.R. § 201.8(a) (1984) (regarding SEC settlement practices).
67. SEC Rule 202.5(d), 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1984).
68. Id.
69. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 284-85; Lacy, supra note 14, at 440-41; Merrifield,
supra note 22, at 1629.
70. One of the recommendations suggested in the Wells Committee Report was that the
"Commission should adopt in the usual case the practice of notifying [the target] against
whom no further action is contemplated that the staff has concluded its investigation of the
matters referred to in the investigative order and has determined that it will not recommend
the commencement of an enforcement proceeding against [the target]." The Wells Committee
Report, supra note 14, at 1.
71. Lacy, supra note 14, at 435 ("The daily operations of the securities industry depend on
reputation and trust."); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("So much
of the stock market depends upon faith and reputation that the court should be reluctant to
lend its weight to any unnecessary publicity in connection with a pending lawsuit."); Merri-
field, supra note 22, at 1594. Merrifield states in his article:
Even though an investigation is not an indication that the SEC has determined that a
violation has occurred, and despite the [non-public] nature of both informal and for-
mal investigations, when the existence of an investigation does become known it can
have detrimental effects on the [targets]. Persons such as [the target's] clients, cus-
tomers, suppliers, lenders, stockholders and employees who are contacted by the staff
obtain knowledge of the investigation; the knowledge spreads quickly and rumors
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from the mere pendency of an SEC investigation.72 The turmoil and im-
pact generated when third parties learn of a pending SEC investigation of
a target can realistically be mitigated only through the efforts of the
target.
First, what will the target do to mitigate the negative publicity that
inevitably occurs when third parties learn of a pending SEC investigation
after receiving SEC administrative subpoenas? The target would like to
contact subpoena recipients and assure them that the SEC is conducting
only an investigation, that no charges have been lodged against the target,
that the SEC simply believes that securities laws violations have oc-
curred, and that the SEC is looking for evidence to support this belief.
These assurances must be immediately forthcoming in order to dispel the
accusatory and compelling nature of the SEC's third party subpoena.73
Second, the target will want to explain to the third party the target's
side of the story. Many targets, not unexpectedly, will deny the veracity
of the SEC's charges of wrongdoing. The target would like to have an
opportunity to explain to the third party the factual and legal basis of its
denial of the SEC's allegations of securities laws violations.
The target has real incentive to undertake efforts to contact indepen-
dently third parties to provide any necessary assurances and to explain
the target's position because these subpoenaed third parties are fre-
quently tied in some fashion to the target's ability to conduct his or her
business affairs within the securities industry. 74 Although there may be
considerable time and expense involved in contacting these third parties,
the target frequently will want to communicate with them to preserve his
or her business relationships." This is especially true within the securi-
begin to circulate. Those who become aware of the investigation may interpret it as
an accusation or predetermination that the [target] has violated the law, despite con-
stant SEC disclaimers to the contrary.
Id. at 1594 (footnote omitted).
72. See Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 576 ("[T]he very initiation of an investigation by the
[SEC] under the securities acts is a substantial sanction upon the investigatee."); Lacy, supra
note 14, at 435.
73. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; Lacy, supra note 14, at 439 ("Upon
learning of an SEC investigation, the public had traditionally assumed that the subject has in
fact violated the law.").
74. Lacy, supra note 14, at 438-39 ("The first group to learn of the investigation is typi-
cally made up of those with whom the target does business, who are the most promising wit-
nesses, yet whose knowledge of the inquiry is the most damaging to the target."); see also supra
note 71.
75. The Supreme Court in O'Brien suggested that the target will contact these third parties
for improper purposes, such as witness intimidation. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2720, 2730 (1984). The Court's suggestion assumes that the target will also be in a position to
harass the third party witness, when, in fact, the opposite may just as likely be true. It is
entirely possible that the third party witness may be in a position to harass or threaten the
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ties industry where confidence-based relationships from the cornerstone
of the securities professional's ability to compete.76 Obviously, the ear-
lier the target contacts his or her business acquaintances, the better the
chances are of the target being able to explain his or her position regard-
ing the pending SEC investigation so as to mitigate the harm that might
otherwise result to these business relationships.
By contrast, the SEC has no real incentive to mitigate the harm to
the target from negative publicity resulting from the mere pendency of an
investigation. Indeed, as the party initiating and pursuing the investiga-
tion, the SEC has an obvious stake in indicating its belief that the target
has committed the alleged securities laws violations. It is patently obvi-
ous that, even if the SEC were prevailed upon to undertake any of the
explanations required to preserve the target's business relationships with
third party subpoena recipients, it is highly unlikely that the SEC's ef-
forts would be successful.
77
target. This is often the case in connection with an SEC investigation of a registered broker-
dealer, where the SEC issues an administrative subpoena to an important customer of the
broker-dealer. This customer may wield significant economic clout vis-a-vis his agent, the
broker-dealer. This unequal bargaining power renders it highly unlikely that the broker-dealer
will be able to intimidate the witness. On the other hand, the broker-dealer's continued associ-
ation with this valued customer may be important to the target's ability to earn his or her
livelihood in the securities industry. See Lacy, supra note 14, at 435. Other examples, where
the business relationship between the target and the third party subpoena recipient is impor-
tant to the target's professional livelihood, are not hard to discover, such as the relationship
between the target and his bank, the target and his trade creditors, the target and his custom-
ers and the target and his employer. Frequently, in these situations, it is unlikely that the
target will be in a position to intimidate this business associate who receives an SEC subpoena.
76. Lacy, supra note 14, at 435; Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y.
1968).
In SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
958 (1970), the court concluded that the SEC's administrative subpoena, which was issued to
the target during the course of an SEC investigation under the Investment Advisors Act and
which demanded that the target produce certain documents, was enforceable despite the tar-
get's claim, inter alia, that enforcement would abridge the target's freedom of press rights
guaranteed to it under the first amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed:
The alternative method by which the Commission might have attempted to
investigate the commercial activities of the [target] would have been more likely to
threaten a chilling of free expression than would compliance with the subpoena in
question. The Commission might have addressed separate queries to all the securi-
ties industry institutions which supply the material the [target] publishes, or to the
investment community members likely to be among its more prominent subscribers.
Such a probe could have generated rumors which might have been much more diffi-
cult to counteract, and much more damaging, than the private investigation in
question.
Id. at 1381 (footnote omitted).
77. Lacy, supra note 14, at 439-40.
The Wells Committee suggested that all formal orders and letters accompanying sub-
poenas prominently display a statement that institution of an investigation does not
mean that the Commission has concluded that a violation has occurred. Recently,
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If an SEC investigation pursuant to an FOI results in no further
proceedings taken against the target, the negative impact resulting from
the publicizing of the investigation to third party subpoena recipients
may linger on and continue to impact negatively on the "target," who is
now no longer a target.78
Obviously, this damage could have been lessened or eliminated had
the target received notice so that the target could have shouldered the
burden and the expense of contacting the subpoenaed third parties to
provide any necessary assurances and/or explanations. If the target lies
in his or her explanation to the third party about any of the details of the
suspected securities laws violations that are the subject of the pending
SEC investigation, the traditional antifraud remedies exist. 79 However, if
no charges are ever lodged against the target, the target, absent informal
notice of the issuance of the SEC third party subpoena from the sub-
poena recipient itself, will have had no opportunity to exonerate himself
or herself with his or her business associates. 80 This can be particularly
the Commission implemented this suggestion in part, by including in subpoenas a
notice that the "investigation should not be taken as an adverse reflection on any
individual, business or security." Although helpful, even these efforts are far from a
complete solution because the Commission could never deny the suspicion of miscon-
duct manifested by the investigation, and news of that suspicion would itself impede
participation in the securities markets.
Id.
78. See Lacy, supra note 14, at 440 ("Sometimes the staff will decide not to recommend
any action against the target, but the rumors and suspicions will persist."). See supra notes 63-
68 and accompanying text.
79. The traditional antifraud remedies include § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act, common law fraud, and state securities laws provisions such as CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25401 (West 1977). Additionally, such misconduct on the part of the target may serve
as a further basis for SEC administrative investigation of the target.
80. In this type of situation, the absence of a notice requirement creates a distinction
among SEC administrative targets. Those targets who are fortunate enough to receive infor-
mal notice of the issuance of third party subpoenas will have the opportunity to explain to the
third party the nature of the SEC investigation and the basis of the target's denial or other
position with respect to the SEC's allegations. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in
O'Brien, those targets who do not receive informal notice of the issuance of third party admin-
istrative subpoenas will be denied the opportunity to extend these assurances and explanations
to the target's business acquaintances, including the third party subpoena recipients. In the
event that no charges are lodged against the target following the SEC's formal investigation,
the absence of any such explanation during the pendency of the investigation may have led to
harsh results being visited on the head of the unsuspecting target, in the form of loss of cus-
tomers or other examples of loss of confidence in the target.
Moreover, to the extent that informal notice cures the evils that result from the O'Brien
ruling, we let happenstance govern the rights of targets. Those targets who get informal notice
can assert their Powell rights and other rights with regard to third party subpoenas. Those
who receive no notice are denied these opportunities. The Powell rights seem important
enough that they should be assured to all targets and should not depend on the vagaries of
informal notice.
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disastrous to the target's business interests in those situations where the
SEC'sfailure to institute enforcement proceedings is the only notification
that the target may receive that no charges will be entered against the
target, that is, that the target's name has been cleared."1 The target who
has received notice of all third party subpoenas issued by the SEC and
who has contacted these business associates to explain the target's posi-
tion with respect to the SEC's allegations of wrongdoing may find these
efforts to have been extremely valuable in the event that the SEC investi-
gation leads to no further proceedings. The target's assurances and ex-
planations during the pendency of the FOI proceedings may have
preserved his or her business relationships, which otherwise may have
terminated on the strength of the SEC's allegations of wrongdoing.
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court accepted the SEC's policy argument
that a notice requirement would impose an undue burden on the SEC's
ability to carry out its enforcement responsibilities under the federal se-
curities laws. However, the Court's decision did not weigh the counter-
vailing interests of the target, particularly the negative publicity directed
to the target of an SEC investigation and its ramifications.
III. O'BRIEN REVISITED
.4. The Factual Background of the SEC Investigation Involved in
O'Brien
In 1978, the SEC began informally to look into certain trading activ-
ities of Harry Magnuson, and the corporation of which he was the princi-
pal shareholder, H.F. Magnuson & Co., a certified public accounting
firm.82 The focus of the SEC's investigation was whether Magnuson
traded in the stock of a specified mining company on the basis of mate-
rial, non-public information.
In September 1980, the SEC entered its FOI, captioned "In the
Matter of H.F. Magnuson & Co.," which described the conduct and/or
transactions that were to be investigated and specified that these activi-
ties were alleged to be violative of the registration, reporting and an-
tifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
81. See supra notes 68 & 70 and accompanying text. The SEC does not always notify the
target that no further proceedings will be instituted. If the target has not received notice of all
third party subpoenas and promptly explained his or her position, the target's ultimate vindi-
cation in the form of no further SEC proceedings against the target may be a hollow victory if
the third party subpoena recipients, who are business associates of the target, have already
terminated their dealings with the target.
82. Unless otherwise indicated, Harry Magnuson and H.F. Magnuson & Co. hereinafter
will be referred to collectively as Magnuson.
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Exchange Act of 1934.83
"The FOI stated that 'Magnuson, Pennaluna & Co., Inc., Benjamin
A. Harrison, corporations headquartered at H.F. Magnuson & Co., and
others' were suspected of engaging in securities violations. Neither Jerry
T. O'Brien nor Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., doing business as Pennaluna &
Co., was named in the FOI. '' 4 The terms of the FOI also delegated
subpoena power to certain identified SEC personnel."5
The SEC then issued an administrative subpoena to O'Brien, re-
questing production of business and financial records and other
documents.
8 6
O'Brien voluntarily complied with the subpoena. Shortly thereafter,
"in response to several inquiries by O'Brien's counsel, a member of the
SEC staff informed O'Brien that it was a 'subject' of the investigation.""7
O'Brien then commenced an action in federal district court seeking, inter
alia, to enjoin the SEC's investigation. At about the same time as the
SEC subpoenas were issued to O'Brien, a news article describing the
SEC's investigation of the targets and describing certain aspects of the
SEC's FOI in this matter, was published in the newspaper that circulated
in the Spokane, Washington area, where O'Brien and certain of the other
targets conduct some of their business activities.8 On motion by the
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2723.
84. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984). Unless otherwise indicated, Jerry T. O'Brien and Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. hereinaf-
ter will be referred to collectively as O'Brien. Benjamin A. Harrison is the sole shareholder of
Pennaluna & Company, Inc., a private investment company, and Mr. Harrison is presently
serving as Secretary of the Spokane Stock Exchange, a national securities exchange. Although
Pennaluna & Company, Inc. was a securities broker prior to 1970, it now licenses its name to
Mr. O'Brien and his corporation, Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. The relationship among the parties
under investigation by the SEC apparently is that Mr. Harrison is an employee of O'Brien;
Magnuson is the accountant for O'Brien and for Pennaluna and Company, Inc.; and Mr.
Magnuson is a customer of Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., a securities broker-dealer. Unless otherwise
referenced, O'Brien, Magnuson, Mr. Harrison and Pennaluna & Company, Inc., constituting
the parties involved in the O'Brien litigation, will be referred to collectively as the targets or
the plaintiffs, since "for the purposes of this litigation, the interests of all these [parties] are
identical." O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2723 n.2.
85. O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2723.
86. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984).
87. O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2723.
88. Wallace Man Target of SEC Probe, Kellogg Evening News, July 22, 1981; see also
Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, SEC v. Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Respondents' Brief, O'Brien].
In Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952),
which involved a derivative suit instituted by a shareholder of an insolvent corporation that
had been the subject of an SEC administrative investigation, the plaintiff alleged that the bank-
ruptcy of the corporation was caused by the manner in which the SEC conducted and publi-
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SEC, the federal district court dismissed the targets' request for injunc-
tive relief.89
Although it was then empowered by statute to bring subpoena en-
forcement actions against the targets to compel compliance with its prior
subpoena requests, the SEC declined to undertake such actions. Had the
SEC instituted a subpoena enforcement action, the targets, as subpoena
recipients, would have been provided with a forum in which to test their
claim that the SEC subpoenas were defective for a variety of reasons,
including the SEC's alleged failure to comply with the Powell
standards.90
Instead, the SEC "waged an aggressive investigation, issuing numer-
ous subpoenas in the Spokane area to various mining companies and bro-
kers." 91 Indeed, the targets contended that upwards of sixty third party
subpoenas were issued as part of the SEC's administrative
investigation. 92
The targets then returned to the district court, requesting, inter alia,
that the SEC be required to give notice to the targets of any third party
subpoenas it issued as part of its investigation of the targets. By its order
of March 25, 1982, the district court declined to impose such a notice
requirement on the SEC. The targets then appealed this decision to the
Ninth Circuit, which reversed the lower court and ordered the SEC to
give the targets notice of third party subpoenas issued during the course
cized its investigation of the target corporation. Without disputing that the corporation could
have been, or in fact was, harmed because of the adverse publicity resulting from, inter alia, the
SEC's delivery of an allegedly "secret" report of its investigation to a local newspaper, the
court nonetheless dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that all of the SEC actions
which the plaintiff complained of were within the statutory authority delegated by Congress to
the SEC under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 36.
89. O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2724.
90. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984); see infra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
91. See Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, No. C-81-546 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 1982), reprinted
in Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10a, SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984) [hereinafter cited as District Court Order in O'Brien]. The targets claimed that
the SEC was seeking substantially the same information by way of these third party subpoenas
that had been requested in the earlier subpoenas directed at the targets. In this manner, the
targets contended the SEC was attempting "an 'end run' around the procedural safeguards set
forth in Powell," by denying the targets the opportunity to test judicially the validity of the
SEC subpoenas through enforcement of the SEC's subpoenas directed to the investigative
targets. Id. Moreover, the targets contended that the SEC's failure to give the targets notice
of the third party subpoenas likewise denied the targets the opportunity to intervene to test the
validity of the third party subpoenas under the Powell standards. Id. at 1 la. For further
discussion of this claim of the target, see infra notes 119-20 & 125.
92. Respondents' Brief, O'Brien, supra note 88, at 8.
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of its investigation.93 The stage was set for the Supreme Court to resolve
the competing interests of the SEC and the targets. Its failure to do so
may have reversed a developing body of important decisional authority.
B. The Targets' Argument that They are Entitled to Receive Notice of
Third Party Subpoenas
The targets based their claim of a right to receive notice of the SEC's
third party subpoenas on two Supreme Court decisions, Reisman v. Cap-
lin 94 and United States v. Powell,9" and their progeny.
In Reisman, the Court held that the recipient of an administrative
summons "may challenge the summons . . . on any appropriate
ground."96 The Court also stated that "third parties might intervene to
protect their interests, or in the event [that the subject of the administra-
tive investigation] is not a party to the summons .. . , he, too, may
intervene."97 Reisman further established that "both parties summoned
and those affected by a disclosure may appear or intervene before the
District Court and challenge the [administrative] summons by asserting
their constitutional or other claims." 98 Although Reisman involved an
Internal Revenue Service99 administrative subpoena, the principles dis-
cussed in Reisman have been applied to SEC subpoenas, 1°° and to vari-
ous other federal agency administrative summons.
10 1
93. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984).
94. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
95. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
96. 375 U.S. at 449. In Reisman, the Internal Revenue Service had issued an administra-
tive summons to the accounting firm retained by taxpayers requesting production of the finan-
cial records of taxpayers. The taxpayers' attorneys, who had provided the requested
documents to the accounting firm, brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court ruled that the attorneys' action must be dis-
missed because they had an adequate remedy at law in that the Internal Revenue Service can
enforce the summons only by an action in court, and, at that time, the witness, or any party
affected by the requested disclosures, may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground.
Id. at 450.
97. Id. at 449.
98. Id. at 445.
99. Hereinafter referred to as the IRS.
100. See, e.g., SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec., Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 123 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Amarillo Nat'l
Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1042, 1043 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
101. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1977). In Atlantic
Richfield, the court stated that the target "may raise all its due process and regulatory proce-
dural objections in any enforcement proceeding brought against it. Additionally, it may inter-
vene and raise objections as a party 'affected by a disclosure,' in subpoena enforcement
proceedings against [recipients of third party subpoenas]." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting
Reisman, 375 U.S. at 445); Federal Election Comm'n v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F.
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One of the "appropriate grounds" on which an administrative sub-
poena may be challenged is its failure to satisfy the criteria set out in
United States v. Powell. Before a district court will order the summoned
party to comply, the IRS
must show that [1] the investigation will be conducted pursuant
to a legitimate purpose, [2] that the inquiry may be relevant to
the purpose, [3] that the information sought is not already
within the [agency's] possession, and [4] that the administrative
steps required by [statute] have been followed .
1. The Powell criteria
The Powell criteria specifically refer to judicial enforcement of an
administrative summons issued during the course of an IRS administra-
tive investigation."l 3 In establishing the four-prong test, the Supreme
Court relied on its authority to fashion appropriate standards for sub-
poena enforcement to assure that the judiciary's process is not abused by
an administrative agency. 'I The Supreme Court observed that IRS sub-
poenas are not self-enforcing."0 5 Instead, Congress enacted a statute that
specifically requires judicial intervention to compel an IRS subpoena re-
cipient to comply with an administrative subpoena and that gives the
agency no power to impose sanctions.
1 0 6
Supp. 587, 599 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (The target's "rights to intervene and object may be exercised
even when the subpoenaed third party intends to voluntarily comply. A party with a right to
intervene. . . may also intervene in the agency proceeding."), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d
1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
102. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
103. Ten months after Reisman, the Supreme Court decided Powell, in which the Court
addressed the question of what standards the IRS must meet in order to obtain judicial en-
forcement under § 7604 of the Internal Revenue code of IRS administrative subpoenas issued
pursuant to § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 7602 delegates subpoena power to
the Commissioner of the IRS. The language of § 7602 and § 7604 is substantially identical to
the analogous provisions under the federal securities laws. See, ag., 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1982)
(Securities Exchange Act). The Powell case involved an IRS summons issued to the president
of a corporate taxpayer in connection with an IRS taxpayer investigation for tax years for
which assessment would have been barred in the absence of fraud. The Supreme Court was
primarily concerned with the criteria which the IRS had to satisfy in order to obtain judicial
enforcement of an IRS administrative subpoena issued as part of its investigation of the corpo-
rate taxpayer. The Court ruled that the IRS need not make a showing of probable cause to
suspect fraud before enforcement of its summons would be ordered. The Court then went on
to set forth the four-prong test which must be satisfied before a district court will order compli-
ance with an IRS administrative subpoena.
104. 379 U.S. at 57-58. See also United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 313-14
(1978).
105. 379 U.S. at 58 n.18.
106. Id.; United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1974). InBisceglia, the Court stated:
Congress has provided protection from arbitrary or capricious action by placing the
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Given this legislative scheme, the Powell Court concluded that the
courts should not simply act as rubber stamps, automatically approving
every administrative subpoena that the courts are requested to enforce.107
To adopt any other approach would render meaningless the statutory
requirement of judicial review of an administrative agency's request for
judicial enforcement of its process.10 8 Thus, the Supreme Court created
the four Powell criteria in order to give meaning to the statutory require-
ment that the IRS seek judicial enforcement of an IRS subpoena.10 9
Although the Powell case involved an administrative subpoena is-
federal courts between the Government and the person summoned. The District
Court in this case conscientiously discharged its duty to see that a legitimate investi-
gation was being conducted and that the summons was no broader than necessary to
achieve its purpose.
Id. See also Reisman, 375 U.S. at 446; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 487, 489-90
(8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673, 679 (Emer. Ct. Ap. 1982)
("[T]here are no self-executing enforcement powers attributed to the agency. In these circum-
stances, the subpoenaed party risks no penalties for good faith non-compliance at the agency
level."); Church of World Peace, Inc. v. IRS, 715 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir. 1983).
107. 379 U.S. at 58. See also Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 822 (1980). The court in Wearly stated:
We start from the basic premise that a subpoena from the FTC is not self enforcing.
The agency must go to the district court and petition for an order directing compli-
ance with the subpoena. In acting on that petition the district court's role is not that
of a mere rubber stamp, but of an independent reviewing authority called upon to
insure the integrity of the proceeding.
Id.
108. Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1946). In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter
described the policy considerations underlying Congress' determination that an administrative
subpoena should not be self-executing:
Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, it became a conventional
feature of Congressional regulatory legislation to give administrative agencies author-
ity to issue subpoenas for relevant information. Congress has never attempted, how-
ever, to confer upon an administrative agency itself the power to compel obedience to
such a subpoena. It is beside the point to consider whether Congress was deterred by
constitutional difficulties. That Congress should so consistently have withheld pow-
ers of testimonial compulsion from administrative agencies discloses a policy that
speaks with impressive significance.
Instead of authorizing agencies to enforce their subpoenas, Congress has re-
quired them to resort to the courts for enforcement. In the discharge of that duty
courts act as courts and not as administrative adjuncts. The power of Congress to
impose on courts the duty of enforcing obedience to an administrative subpoena was
sustained precisely because courts were not to be automata carrying out the wishes of
the administrative.
Id. at 603-04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. 379 U.S. at 58. See also United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638,
642 (5th Cir. 1973) (Before a court can enforce an administrative subpoena issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act, the court must determine
that the Powell criteria have been satisfied. "The system of judicial enforcement is designed to
provide a meaningful day in court for one resisting an administrative subpoena."); United
States v. Tobins, 512 F. Supp. 308, 312 (D.C. Mass. 1981) ("Some review of the validity of the
subpoena is clearly contemplated by the statute; otherwise the court would function as a mere
rubber stamp and referral of agency subpoenas to the court for enforcement would be point-
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sued by the IRS, its holding has been extended to proceedings instituted
by other federal administrative agencies seeking to enforce their adminis-
trative subpoenas.11 ' Even prior to O'Brien, the courts had used the
Powell test to determine the validity of SEC administrative subpoenas. 11
It is fairly easy for an administrative agency to show compliance
less."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Fitch Oil Co., 676 F.2d 673 (Emer. Ct.
App. 1982).
110. See, e.g., Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646, 650 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Federal Trade Commission administrative subpoena); Lynn v. Biderman, 536 F.2d 820, 824
(9th Cir.) (In a case involving an administrative subpoena issued by the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, the Ninth Circuit observed that in Powell the Supreme Court
"established the standard for obtaining judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas is-
sued by an agency. . . . Standards which parallel that established in Powell have been estab-
lished with respect to subpoenas issued by other administrative agencies."), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Armada Petroleum Corp., 562 F. Supp. 43, 50, 52-53 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (Department of Energy administrative subpoena), af'd, 700 F.2d 706 (1983);
NLRB v. Costello, 296 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Conn. 1968) (National Labor Relations Board ad-
ministrative subpoena); EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 719 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.
1983) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative subpoena).
These cases recognize the similarity of the statutory framework for issuance and enforce-
ment of administrative summons as adopted by Congress under various federal statutes. Con-
gress delegates subpoena power to the federal administrative agency; however, enforcement of
the administrative subpoena requires judicial intervention. In Powell itself, the Supreme Court
reviewed its decisions dealing with the subpoena power of federal administrative agencies in
general, and observed that "[w]hile the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue de-
rives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations
are without force when the scope of the Commissioner's power is called in question." Powell,
379 U.S. at 57. See also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 123-24 (3d
Cir. 1981); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir. 1966) ("We therefore
view these corresponding [administrative subpoena issuance and enforcement] provisions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and of the Internal Revenue Code as in pari materia.").
The policy reasons that underlie this general legislative approach to administrative pro-
cess were set forth in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., wherein the Third Circuit stated that
the issuance and enforcement of IRS administrative process
follows the classic model, without in any way purporting to limit the power of the
judiciary to choose an appropriate rule of decision in an enforcement proceeding. In
other subpoena enforcement proceedings the courts have looked to non-statutory
sources for appropriate guidance ...
We conclude that from the very fact that enforcement of [an administrative sub-
poena] is. . . entrusted to the judiciary, this court has the power to fashion appro-
priate rules as to the fairness of the enforcement order. . . [since] "it is the court's
process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not
permit its process to be abused."
648 F.2d at 124 (quoting United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 937 (1976) and Powell, 379
U.S. at 58).
111. See, e.g., SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); SEC v. ESM Gov't See. Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 313 n.3
(5th Cir. 1981) ("It is generally agreed, however, that the principles of these cases [Powell and
Reisman] apply to SEC subpoenas as well. ... In applying IRS cases to the issue before us,
we do not suggest that every aspect of the law regarding an IRS summons controls an SEC
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with the Powell criteria." 2 The courts nonetheless require a factual
subpoena."); SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1981). The
court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh stated:
We assume as do the parties, that the same standards are applicable to enforcement
of SEC subpoenas as Internal Revenue Service summonses. Thus, the subpoena is-
sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, like the administrative subpoena
issued by the Federal Trade Commission, and the Interstate Trade Commission, as
well as the administrative summons [issued under the Internal Revenue Code] is
subject to the same judicial scrutiny prior to enforcement.
Id. (citations omitted); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 n.39 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1975);
Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D. Mont. 1980).
112. The summons enforcement proceeding is intended to be a summary proceeding. It is
initiated when the administrative agency files a petition for enforcement. The federal agency
must submit, along with its petition, evidence of its compliance with the Powell criteria, which
in general are the standards that must be satisfied for the issuance of an administrative sum-
mons. Assuming that the agency meets that burden, the district court will then enter an order
to show cause why the administrative summons should not be enforced. The summons recipi-
ent will then have a limited amount of time to respond to the order to show cause. At this
time, the burden of proof shifts to the summons recipient to establish his or her defense that
judicial enforcement of administrative process would constitute abuse of the court's process or
should otherwise be denied. Although there is general agreement that this burden is a heavy
one, the courts have disagreed as to the degree of proof required to satisfy this burden. See,
e.g., United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 70 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 1981). In general, the summons recipient is required to
challenge the federal agency's Powell showing by filing responsive pleadings, supported by
affidavits that allege specific facts which tend to refute the agency's showing of compliance. If
at this point the taxpayer has failed to refute the administrative agency's prima facie showing
of compliance with the Powell criteria, then generally, the district court will rule on the matter
on the basis of the parties' pleadings without an evidentiary hearing. SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d
226, 229 (1st Cir. 1975).
The summons recipient may be entitled, upon proper request to the district court, to
engage in a limited amount of discovery to assist in meeting the burden of showing specific
facts that rebut the agency's prima facie showing. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517, 528-29 (1970), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, including the discovery provisions, apply to summary proceedings such as administrative
subpoena enforcement proceedings, although the Court also recognized the inherent power of
the district court to limit the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in summary
proceedings. See also United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 1975); Powell,
379 U.S. at 58 n.18.
The summons recipient's right to an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the
administrative summons ought to be judicially enforced is not absolute. However, the courts
disagree as to the requisite degree of showing that must be made by the recipient in its respon-
sive pleadings in order to gain the right to an evidentiary, adversarial hearing on the issue of
subpoena enforcement. In other words, the summons recipient is not automatically entitled to
an evidentiary hearing before the district court will order enforcement of the administrative
subpoena. "While courts may have disagreed on the appropriate standard, they have agreed
that the taxpayer must make some threshold showing to be entitled to the hearing." United
States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 539 n.39 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982). With
respect to this evidentiary hearing, at least one court has said that the summons recipient must:
develop facts from which a court might infer a possibility of some wrongful conduct
by the [administrative agency] ....
If the [summons recipient] can present enough specific facts to meet this stan-
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showing of compliance with the Powell criteria to satisfy themselves that
the staff of an administrative agency have not exceeded the scope of their
statutory authority in the issuance of administrative process. 113 After all,
the SEC decides in the first place what material is relevant to its pending
investigation. 14 The same SEC investigator then frames a subpoena re-
questing this information.11 5  That administrative subpoena cannot be
enforced unless a district court first determines that the SEC has acted
properly by complying with the Powell standards.116 Thus, judicial inter-
vention for the purpose of examining an agency's administrative process
to determine compliance with the four-prong Powell test provides assur-
ance that an administrative agency will not exceed its statutory delega-
tion of subpoena authority. 17 In sum, the Powell criteria do have some
dard, he is entitled to an adversarial hearing. This hearing should be held within
sixty days after the filing of his response. At the hearing, the [administrative agency]
can make its prima facie case through the introduction into evidence of the affidavits
submitted with the petition for enforcement that began the proceedings. The [admin-
istrative agency] could also present other evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to
counter the specific allegations made by the [summons recipient] that were sufficient
to warrant the holding of the hearing. The [summons recipient] would then be able
to present his case, which would include the specific allegations made in his respon-
sive pleading. The [summons recipient] would also be able to examine under oath
the [government representatives] responsible for the investigation and any other wit-
nesses he may call. . . . [T]he court should not permit the hearing to become a pure
fishing expedition by the [summons recipient]. The testimony he seeks should be
related to some possible abuse of process as could be inferred from previously
presented evidence. The court may within its discretion limit testimony if the ques-
tioning moves too far afield ...
[ . . T]he [summons recipient] bears an extraordinarily heavy burden at the
hearing. He can succeed only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence some
improper use of the summons by the [administrative agency].
Id. at 540 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st
Cir. 1979); United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F.
Supp. 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Zack, 375 F. Supp. 825 (D.C. Nev. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Knopfier, 658 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975).
113. See United States v. Bell, 564 F.2d 953, 959 (Emer. Ct. App. 1977) ("Bifurcation of the
power, on the one hand of the agency to issue subpoenas and on the other hand of the courts to
enforce them, is an inherent protection against abuse of subpoena power.").
114. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
117. In United States v. Monsey, the court stated:
Enforcement [of administrative summonses] enlists judicial powers of compulsion
which are not automatically invocable. The Court may not permit its process to be
abused. Inquiry into circumstances surrounding the original issuance of the sum-
monses may reveal improper purposes which judicial enforcement should not sanc-
tion through assistance. Enforcement would be equally objectionable where the
judicial action would itself effect an abuse of the summons. Events subsequent to
administrative issuance may change circumstances to such an extent that enforce-
ment of a summons may bring about inproprieties. Such equitable considerations
demand that the court consider intervening occurrences as well as the status quo at
the date of issuance. . . . Cognizance of those facts does no more violence to admin-
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substance, despite the administrative agencies' protestations to the con-
trary on the ground that these standards are so easily satisfied. 118
2. The targets' right of intervention to assert agency's failure to
satisfy Powell criteria
In O'Brien, the targets argued that the Supreme Court's earlier deci-
sion in Reisman v. Caplin permitted them to request intervention in sub-
poena proceedings instituted by the SEC against a non-complying third
party." 9 Relying in large part on language stating that the target, as a
party "affected by a disclosure," has the right to request intervention in
third party proceedings "on any appropriate ground,"'120 the targets in
O'Brien argued that "any appropriate ground" includes the alleged fail-
ure of the SEC to satisfy the Powell criteria.
The Reisman Court specifically mentioned several claims that the
target of an administrative investigation could assert as appropriate
grounds for intervention in a third party administrative subpoena en-
forcement proceeding, such as the attorney-client privilege or a claim
that the subpoenaed material "is sought for the improper purpose of ob-
taining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution."' 21 Moreover, the
Court's enumeration in Reisman of some appropriate substantive
grounds on which to challenge the validity of an administrative subpoena
did not purport to be exhaustive.
122
istrative process than does inquiry into the good faith of the summons or contentions
of harassment.
429 F.2d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir. 1970) (citations omitted).
118. United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973). The
court in Security State Bank stated:
Where the person who is subject to the subpoena refuses to comply and challenges
the subpoena in court, the burden is upon the [administrative agency] to show that
the investigation is for a lawful purpose and that the evidence sought in the subpoena
is relevant to the investigation. This follows from the fact, first, that an affirmative
showing of lawfulness is necessary to enable the court to discharge its affirmative
duty[]. . . to determine the extent to which the subpoena is in accordance with law
and to enforce the subpoena to that extent. Second, the acceptable practice under
analogous administrative schemes, as defined by the cases, requires the government
to sustain a minimum burden analogous to the one imposed here. The cases teach
that the burden is not great, but they teach that it does exist.
Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
119. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
120. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 124-25 (3d Cir.
1981). The court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. stated:
Our analysis is further supported by the persistent theme running through the
[Supreme] Court's decisions in this area that an administrative summons can be chal-
lenged "on any appropriate ground.". . [The Court has subsequently quoted this
language [in several of its opinions]. . . . In LaSalle, the Court went even further
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Notably, the targets in O'Brien never argued that their right of inter-
vention under Reisman was mandatory. This position is in accord with
established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a target's right of
intervention is permissive only and that the judicial determination of
whether intervention should be granted in a particular case requires
"[tihe usual process of balancing opposing equities."
123
3. A target must receive notice of SEC's third party subpoenas to
protect his or her rights under Reisman and Powell
In order to assert his or her rights under Powell or to assert any
other appropriate challenge to the SEC's subpoena, a target must receive
prior notice of the issuance of the administrative subpoena to the third
party. Without such notice, a target is unaware of the opportunity to
assert his or her rights and whatever rights he or she may have thereby
become illusory. 124
In O'Brien, the targets asked the district court for notice of adminis-
trative process issued by the SEC to third parties as part of its investiga-
tion of the targets. The targets asserted that they could only protect their
rights to be investigated in accordance with the standards enunciated in
Powell if they first received notice of the third party subpoenas. The
targets could do this by instituting an action to restrain a third party
from voluntarily complying with a subpoena that was defective because it
did not comply with the Powell standards, or alternatively, by seeking
intervention in a third party subpoena enforcement proceeding instituted
by the SEC.125
to emphasize that "[tihe Powell elements were not intended as an exclusive statement
about the meaning of good faith."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964) and United States
v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 n.19 (1978) (citations omitted)). See also United
States v. Riewe, 676 F.2d 418, 420 n.1 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. LaSalle Nat'1 Bank,
437 U.S. 298, 318 n.20 (1978) ("These requirements [for the enforcement of an IRS summons]
are not intended to be exclusive. Future cases may well reveal the need to prevent other forms
of agency abuse of congressional authority and judicial process."); SEC v. ESM Gov't Sec.,
Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The Supreme Court has never provided a complete
list of the 'appropriate ground[s]' referred to in Reisman.").
123. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1971). Orders denying intervention
are appealable. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 449.
124. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2720 (1984).
125. See District Court Order in O'Brien, supra note 91, at l0a-lla. The targets in O'Brien
also argued that, on the facts of their case, the SEC's strategy had the effect of doing an "end
run" around a target's legal remedy of refusal to comply with the SEC subpoena directed to
the target, expecting that the SEC would then commence subpoena enforcement proceedings
to compel the target's compliance with the SEC administrative subpoena. The district court
rejected this argument, stating that the targets had an adequate legal remedy. This is consis-
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Although observing that this "argument is not without appeal,"
since "[i]t would be relatively easy to project a hypothetical where a gov-
ernment agency could effectively render the Powell protections a nullity,"
the district court refused to impose a notice requirement on the SEC.126
tent with well established precedent which holds that, since the subpoena served on the target
is not self-executing, the appropriate course of action for the target who objects to the sub-
poena is to refuse to comply with the subpoena, thereby forcing the SEC to institute subpoena
enforcement proceedings in federal district court. The target may then assert its objections to
the validity of the administrative subpoena within the context of these proceedings. Since no
penalty attaches to the target who receives an administrative subpoena for its failure to comply
with the subpoena until such time as a judicial decree ordering compliance with the subpoena
is entered, the legal remedy is deemed adequate, and the target's request for equitable relief,
such as declaratory relief, generally is denied on these grounds. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 445-46.
See also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1977) (The target "had an
adequate remedy at law through [administrative agency] enforcement actions and suffered no
undue hardship in being remitted to that remedy by the district court's denial of (equitable]
relief.").
In the O'Brien case, the SEC declined to institute subpoena enforcement proceedings
against the targets, thereby effectively robbing the targets of the opportunity to challenge the
SEC's administrative subpoenas as violative of the Powell standards. Thus, under the particu-
lar facts of the O'Brien case, the SEC avoided showing compliance with the Powell standards
by the strategy of requesting essentially the same information from third parties who had no
incentive to refuse compliance and test the SEC subpoenas for validity under Powell. The
Supreme Court's ruling in O'Brien can only encourage the SEC to follow this tactic in the
future, thus completely frustrating Congress' intent in requiring judicial review of administra-
tive subpoenas.
126. District Court Order in O'Brien, supra note 91, at 1la. As part of the basis of its
decision in O'Brien, the district court believed that the targets had "an adequate remedy at
law" in that they could seek to suppress information obtained by a third party subpoena defec-
tive under the Powell standards, if and when such information was used in a subsequent civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding instituted by the SEC at the conclusion of its adminis-
trative investigation of the targets. O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2724. Alternatively, the district
court believed that the targets lacked standing to impose a notice requirement on the SEC
because the information sought by subpoenas issued to third parties was information which
belonged to third parties and in which the targets held no protectible interest. District Court
Order in O'Brien, supra note 91, at 12a-13a. Since the subpoenaed information belonged to the
third parties, the district court reasoned that the targets had no blanket right to notice when
this information was sought. Id. In making this ruling, the district court apparently relied
quite heavily on the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976), which "established that, when a person communicates information to a
third party even on the understanding that the information is confidential, he cannot object if
the third party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities."
O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2726. The decision in Miller, however, at most disables the targets in
O'Brien "from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties is necessary to allow a
target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his papers." Id. The Miller decision
does not disable the target from asserting, in the context of third party subpoena enforcement
proceedings, the right to be investigated in accordance with the Powell standards.
The district court did recognize, however, the force of the targets' argument in O'Brien:
The natural query at this juncture is what protections exist for the ostensible
"target" of an investigation if he is not aware of process outstanding against third
parties. Plaintiffs suggest that the only effective remedy would be to require notice to
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court decision, concluding that notice to the target of third
party subpoenas is necessary "[t]o assure that the target has the opportu-
nity to assert" the target's right to be investigated in accordance with the
standards set out in Powell.127
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that there was no constitu-
tional, statutory or decisional authority for imposing a notice require-
ment on the SEC. Although it seems well-settled that there is no
constitutional or statutory basis for any such notice requirement,128 the
Court erred in concluding that there was no case law supporting the
targets' claim that they were entitled to receive notice of the Commis-
sion's issuance of third party process.
those under investigation whenever such process is issued. The argument is not with-
out appeal.
District Court Order in O'Brien, supra note 91, at lla (footnote omitted).
The district court also candidly recognized the importance of the novel question raised by
the targets' claims: "I cannot say with certainty that this heretofore unresolved question could
not be determined otherwise on appeal. The issue is intriguing, eminently arguable, and cer-
tainly substantial in the sense that the questions raised should be authoritatively determined."
Id. at 15a.
127. 704 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984). The basic premise
of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is its conclusion that a "court will not enforce an SEC sub-
poena directed at the target of an investigation unless the agency, at an evidentiary hearing,
demonstrates that it has complied with the requirements of United States v. Powell." 704 F.2d
at 1067. The SEC argued that the rights created under Powell are held only by the subpoena
recipient and therefore the only party entitled to enforce the Powell standards is the recipient
of the administrative summons. The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that the targets of
SEC administrative investigations "do have a right to be investigated consistently with the
Powell standards. As a practical matter, this is a right that only [the investigative targets]
would assert." 704 F.2d at 1068 (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit went on to reason that notice to the target of service of SEC third party
subpoenas was necessary to assure the investigative targets of their opportunity to assert their
"right to be investigated consistently with the Powell standards. . . . As a practical matter,
unless the target of an SEC investigation receives notice of subpoenas served on third parties,
no one will question compliance with the Powell standards as to those subpoenas." 704 F.2d at
1069. See also United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292, 306 (3d Cir. 1978). The court in Genser
stated:
While the third party recipients of summonses may well be motivated to refuse to
comply on the grounds that the summonses are overbroad or unduly burdensome,
there is little reason to expect them to raise the defense that the summonses were
issued to further a solely criminal investigation of the [target]. This is not a matter of
the third party bank's interest but of the [target's]. Thus, the courts have provided
that the [target] may challenge the validity of a summons issued to a third party
either at the investigatory stage or, if necessary, at the trial level.
Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
128. See O'Brien, 104 S. Ct. at 2725-28.
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Justice Marshall, writing for the unanimous Court in O'Brien, dis-
missed the targets' claim based on existing case precedent in a very brief,
three sentence passage:
There are several tenuous links in [the targets'] argument. Es-
pecially debatable are the propositions that a target has a sub-
stantive right to be investigated in a manner consistent with the
Powell standards and the assertion that a target may obtain a
restraining order preventing voluntary compliance by a third
party with an administrative subpoena. Certainly we have never
before expressly so held. 
129
The Court then assumed arguendo that the rights identified and re-
lied on by the targets in O'Brien do exist but nonetheless concluded,
based on certain articulated policy considerations, that the targets were
not entitled to receive notice. 130 The Court's summary treatment of the
targets' decisional law argument is a fundamental flaw in the Court's
analysis and casts doubt on the continuing validity of the Court's earlier
decisions in Powell and Reisman and their progeny.
1. The Court's analysis of the targets' argument based on existing
decisional law
The Court dispensed with the targets' argument based on decisional
precedent by stating that the Supreme Court has never before expressly
held that "a target has a substantive right ot be investigated in a manner
consistent with the Powell standards." ' 1 In support of this carefully
crafted distinction of its earlier holdings, the Court first pointed out that
the specific language in the Reisman decision upon which the targets'
argument was premised had been dictum in that opinion. 3 2 The Court
emphasized that a target's right of intervention is permissive, not
mandatory.1 33 The Court seems to say that the "permissive" nature of a
target's right of intervention means that no underlying substantive right
exists. What this line of reasoning overlooks, however, is that a permis-
sive right of intervention assumes that the target does hold a right to
intervene. The "permissive" nature of this right to intervene does not
deny the existence of the right, but rather describes the manner and cir-
cumstances under which this right may be exercised.
Moreover, this hairsplitting, semantic treatment of the targets' argu-
129. 104 S. Ct. at 2729 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2729 n.19.
133. Id.; see supka note 123 and accompanying text.
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ment by the Court overlooks the substantial body of law developed by
the lower courts, following Reisman and Powell, that there is a right of
intervention to challenge an administrative agency's failure to comply
with the Powell standards."' The Supreme Court did not acknowledge,
much less distinguish, the numerous decisions invoking Reisman and/or
Powell in the specific factual context of a target's request for intervention
in a judicial proceeding instituted by an administrative agency to enforce
its subpoena issued to a third party.
13 5
For example, United States v. Union National Bank136 involved a
taxpayer's (target's) request for leave to intervene in an IRS instituted
proceeding to enforce its summons issued to a third party witness (bank)
during the course of the IRS investigation of the taxpayer (target). The
target claimed in its petition for intervention that the IRS' third party
subpoena failed to comply with the Powell standards. This claim was
based on the grounds that, first, the IRS was not investigating the tax-
payer for a proper purpose since the IRS was considering recommending
institution of a criminal prosecution; and second, that the IRS already
had possession of the requested information. The court noted that the
taxpayer's right to intervention was not absolute but was permissive and
was to be granted only when the "usual process of balancing opposing
134. See supra notes 100-01 & 110-11.
135. See, eg., SEC v. Oklahoma State Bank, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 196,939 (N.D. Tex.
1979); SEC v. Fourth Nat'1 Bank of Tulsa, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,940 (N.D. Okla.
1979); SEC v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Tex. 1979). With respect to non-
SEC administrative investigations that involve the administrative target's reliance on Reisman
and/or Powell as the basis of the target's claim for intervention to challenge the validity of the
federal agency's third party subpoena for failure to comply with Powell criteria, see Callahan v.
First Pa. Bank, 422 F. Supp. 1098, 1099-100 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FTC,
546 F.2d 646, 649-50 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 919 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. First State Bank of Clute, 626 F.2d 1227, 1228 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973); Slocum v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 373 (D. Minn. 1969); United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Monsey, 429 F.2d
1348 (7th Cir. 1970); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Ramos v.
United States, 375 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In Ramos, a taxpayer's motion to quash an
IRS third party subpoena was denied on the ground that "[u]nder the rule of Reisman, [the
taxpayer (target)] has ample and full opportunity for a judicial determination of his challenges
to the [third party] summons [in the summons enforcement hearing]. . . .This is so even
though the [taxpayer (target)] is not the summoned party. Reisman held that interested third
parties might intervene in these enforcement proceedings to protect their interest." Id. at 156;
United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 931 (3d Cir. 1976) (District court permitted taxpayer
(target) of IRS investigation to intervene in proceedings instituted by IRS to enforce third
party subpoenas issued to certain banks and an accountant. The district court's decision to
permit intervention was not an issue raised on appeal to the Third Circuit.).
136. 363 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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equities" '137 weighed in favor of the taxpayer's intervention. The court in
Union National Bank received assurances from IRS representatives as to
the purpose of the IRS' investigation and was satisfied that the docu-
ments sought by the IRS were not already in the possession of the IRS.
The taxpayer's request for intervention therefore was denied because the
IRS actually satisfied the Powell standards. However, the court's discus-
sion of the merits of the taxpayer's request for intervention assumed that
a taxpayer has a right to intervene in a third party subpoena enforcement
proceeding and that an appropriate basis on which to seek intervention is
to assert the failure of the IRS to satisfy the Powell standards when the
third party subpoena was issued.
Equally important, in Union National Bank, the taxpayer alleged
that certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with IRS
subpoena issuance were unconstitutional because these statutes did not
require that the IRS "give notice of the service of the [third party] sum-
mons to the taxpayer." 138 With respect to this claim, the district court
only commented: "This question does trouble the court but is com-
pletely moot in the present case because the respondent bank did, in fact,
notify the taxpayer of the issuance of the summons and a full hearing was
afforded to the taxpayer on his right to intervene." '139
The tone of the court's reasoning suggests that it would have re-
quired that such notice be given had the issue been before it. 'I Indeed,
the court's entire discussion of the taxpayer's (target's) claim for inter-
vention, on the ground that the IRS' third party subpoena failed to sat-
isfy the Powell standards, assumed that a target has "the right to be
investigated in accordance with the Powell standards," and that this right
may be a proper basis on which a taxpayer (target) may seek intervention
in a third party subpoena enforcement proceeding, although in this par-
ticular fact situation the taxpayer's allegations of infringement of its Pow-
ell rights did not tip the equities sufficiently in its favor so as to support a
grant of intervention.
The Court's failure in O'Brien to address the numerous decisions
137. Id. at 633 (quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1971)).
138. Id. at 634.
139. Id.
140. However, the tone of several other decisions suggests that there would have been a
disagreement among the courts as to whether to impose such a notice requirement on federal
administrative agencies, although, notably, none of these decisions required the court to ex-
pressly consider the notice question and none of these decisions were cited by the Supreme
Court as support for its ruling in O'Brien. Thus, the significance of the reasoning in these
decisions is unclear. See, e.g., Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 950 (1965); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir, 1969);
Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th Cir. 1972).
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that rely on the principles handed down in Reisman and Powel1141 casts
doubt on the continued validity of relying on Powell and Reisman for the
proposition that a target does hold a substantive right to challenge an
administrative subpoena for failing to satisfy the standards set out in
Powell. Not unrealistically, Justice Marshall's summary treatment of the
issue would enable counsel for federal administrative agencies to argue
that an administrative target has no substantive rights under Powell.
2. The policy concerns that form the real basis for the Supreme
Court's decision in O'Brien
The Supreme Court, as the final part of its reasoning in O'Brien,
assumed for the sake of argument the existence of the rights asserted by
the targets under Reisman and Powell. Nonetheless, the Court denied
the targets any right to notice of third party subpoenas. This denial was
expressly premised on two policy considerations: administrative burden
and a fear of abuse of the right by targets. In the Court's view, these
policy reasons apparently outweigh any right to notice even were such a
right indicated in light of Powell and Reisman. However, none of the
policy considerations relied on by the Court appear to justify the conclu-
sion reached by the Court. The proper balance between the policy con-
siderations suggested by the SEC and the legal and practical reasons
suggested by the targets in O'Brien does not dictate the prophylactic rule
of no-notice that was adopted by the Court.
a. administrative burden
The Supreme Court emphasized the heavy administrative burden
that would be placed on the SEC and the courts by requiring notice. The
Court first pointed to the problem of defining "targets" for the purpose of
determining who is entitled to receive notice.42 The Court explained:
"The SEC often undertakes investigations into suspicious securities
transactions without any knowledge of which of the parties involved may
have violated the law. To notify all potential wrongdoers in such a situa-
tion of the issuance of each subpoena would be virtually impossible."' 43
What the Court overlooked here, however, was the distinction be-
tween the informal phase and the formal phase of SEC investigations."
During the informal phase of the SEC's investigation, no subpoena
141. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142. 104 S. Ct. at 2729.
143. Id. (footnote omitted).
144. See supra notes 22-24 & 28 and accompanying text.
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power attaches.145 To the extent that the SEC is investigating informally
a multitude of persons suspected of wrongdoing in connection with a
particular securities transaction, there is no problem of identifying
"targets" since no subpoena will issue during this phase. If it results in
formal proceedings,146 the investigation has proceeded sufficiently to
identify certain persons suspected of wrongdoing, as it had in the O'Brien
case.47 In this situation, it is apparent that those persons specifically
identified in the caption of the FOI are the subject of a further SEC in-
vestigation and "are affected by a disclosure." '48 As such, they are
"targets" and their identity is not impossible to ascertain. Notice of third
party subpoenas certainly ought to go to those persons whose identity is
readily ascertainable from the caption of the FOI.
In rare circumstances, the identity of the targets of the investigation
will not be readily ascertainable from the caption of the FOI. An FOI
may be entered where, after an informal investigation, the SEC staff con-
cludes that there is a sufficient factual basis to allege violations of the
federal securities laws but that these allegations must be framed in terms
of "John Does" because the identity of the actual participants cannot yet
be ascertained.149 This does not mean, however, that the ultimate
"targets" of such an investigation do not have the right to be investigated
in accordance with the standards set out in Powell, even while their iden-
tity remains unknown. In this situation, it is possible to develop proce-
dures to protect the unknown targets' rights until such time as their
identity is ascertained and the terms of the SEC's FOI are amended to
include their names as "targets."
Consider an analogous situation: "John Doe summonses" in the
context of IRS administrative investigations. 150 The IRS is required in
145. See supra notes 22 & 28 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
148. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
149. One particularly well-publicized formal SEC administrative investigation of unidenti-
fied targets is the on-going SEC investigation of suspected inside traders in Santa Fe Interna-
tional Corporation stock and options immediately preceding the public announcement in 1981
of the takeover of Santa Fe by Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. For several years, the SEC has
been attempting, through a variety of measures, to learn the identities of these suspected inside
traders. As a result of a recent Swiss court ruling in its favor, the SEC was able to obtain
certain documents that disclosed the identity of certain of these suspected traders. It appears
that these individuals had been pursuing every strategy available to them to protect against
disclosure of their identities to the SEC. Swiss Court Rejects SEC Request in Santa Fe Insider
Trading Case, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 271 (1983); SEC Seeks Default Against "Un-
known" Santa Fe Purchasers, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1210-11 (1984).
150. I.R.C. §§ 7609(f), 7609(h) (1982). The operation of the John Doe summons provisions
in § 7609 has been summarized as follows:
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these situations to go to court and make a showing, by affidavit, that
there is a reasonable basis for believing that a person or group of persons
may fail or may have failed to comply with a provision of the internal
revenue law and that the information requested by subpoena is not read-
ily available from other sources.15' In this way, the law seeks to protect
the rights of the unknown "targets" of IRS administrative investigations.
Since the Supreme Court's concern apparently focuses on ascertaining
the actual identity of the "targets," the analogy to the mechanism of a
"John Doe summons" in the context of IRS investigations provides a
remedy in the relatively infrequent situation where the identity of the
target(s) cannot readily be ascertained from the caption of the FOI en-
tered by the Commission.' 52
The Court considered another administrative burden on the SEC
presumably flowing from a notice requirement: a person not considered
Whenever a summons is issued to such a third-party recordkeeper, [a defined term
under § 7609], the provisions of [§ 7609] allow the taxpayer an opportunity to inter-
vene and assert any legal objections to the IRS's acquisition [of the taxpayer's
records]. There is, however, an exception to this important protection. The excep-
tion is that when the identity of the taxpayer is not known and is thus not revealed in
the summons the IRS proposes to serve, the IRS must petition the Court for issuance
of a "John Doe" summons, which does not name the taxpayers to whom records
sought from the third-party recordkeeper apply. The Court is required to determine
the merits of such a petition for a summons on the basis of an ex parte hearing only.
In such ex parte cases, the burden is upon the IRS to establish [the criteria set out in
§ 7609(f)].
In re Oil and Gas Producers Having Processing Agreements with Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F.
Supp. 440, 441 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
151. The policy objectives that are served by congressional enactment of the procedural
safeguards of § 7609(f) have been described this way:
The rules regarding the service of summonses are divided into three categories. The
IRS is free to serve, without prior judicial approval, a direct summons on any person
if the summons is necessary to facilitate the investigation of that person's tax liability.
If a summons is to be served on a third-party record keeper, however, the IRS must
provide notice to all third parties whose tax records will be affected by the summons
before it may serve the summons. An exception to this rule applies in cases in which
the IRS is unable to determine the identities of these third parties. Under such cir-
cumstances, a John Doe summons may be issued to the record keeper only after the
IRS, in an ex parte hearing, has satisfied the three criteria listed in section 7609(f).
Section 7609(f)'s criteria thus constitute a procedural safeguard which Congress
created to provide extra protection to unknown target taxpayers to whom the IRS
cannot give notice. More specifically, sections 7609(f) and (h) were enacted to pro-
vide a prior restraint on the IRS's power to serve John Doe summonses, mainly "to
preclude the IRS from using such summonses to engage in possible 'fishing expedi-
tions.'" Balancing this purpose, however, was Congress's concern that the restraint
not unreasonably delay or otherwise pose an undue burden on the IRS's legitimate
use of John Doe summonses. Congress therefore required the IRS to apply ex parte
for authorization to issue such summonses, so that "the question whether a John Doe
summons could be served should not become embroiled in an adversary proceeding."
United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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a target would request a hearing to determine his or her status as a tar-
get. 153 However, this concern of the Court misapprehends the realities of
an SEC investigation. The taint of an SEC investigation may have disas-
trous consequences for the target of such an investigation.154 As a result,
individuals rarely seek the status of being named as a target of an SEC
investigation. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an unknown individ-
ual, whose name is not included in the caption of an FOI, would petition
the court for a hearing to determine his or her status as a target, thereby
lifting the veil of anonymity. 5
b. targets who receive notice will use this knowledge to impede SEC
investigations
The second policy consideration expressly identified by the Supreme
Court was that
the imposition of a notice requirement on the SEC would sub-
stantially increase the ability of persons who have something to
hide to impede legitimate investigations by the Commission. A
target given notice of every subpoena issued to third parties
would be able to discourage the recipients from complying, and
then further delay disclosure of damaging information by seek-
ing intervention in all enforcement actions brought by the
153. The Court suggests that a "person not considered a target by the Commission could
contend that he deserved that status and therefore should be given notice of subpoenas issued
to others." 104S. Ct. 2729. This concern of the Court just does not comport with the realities
of those formal SEC investigations where the identities of the targets (subjects) of investigation
are not readily ascertainable. See supra note 149 regarding the ongoing efforts of the SEC to
learn the identity of certain unknown targets, who presumably wish to remain anonymous.
Furthermore, due to the negative publicity that flows from the status of being a target of an
SEC investigation, it is not likely that a person would petition the court to gain that status.
154. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
155. Any such request of a district court is likely to be dismissed very quickly on the basis
of the well-established rules that the courts cannot compel the SEC to undertake an investiga-
tion nor are the courts permitted to review an SEC decision not to investigate a person. See
Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944, 949 (lst Cir. 1947); Gordon v. SEC, [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,628 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Tew & Freedman, supra note 31, at 6.
Moreover, the relatively improbable situation where a person who believes that he or she
is the target of an SEC investigation would request a hearing to determine his or her status as a
"target" is so slight that this potential for administrative burden does not tip the balance of
policy considerations in favor of the no-notice rule adopted by the Supreme Court. If there
continues to be genuine concern about the possibility of unidentified targets bringing motions
to ascertain their identity as targets, then perhaps Congress should consider adoption of a
statute, similar to I.R.C. § 7609(f) regarding the issuance of John Doe summonses. Section
7609(0 seeks to protect the rights of unknown targets of IRS administrative investigations
when the IRS proposes to issue certain types of third party subpoenas. This approach should
adequately dispose of the Court's concern, to the extent that subsequent developments indicate
that it is a realistic one.
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Commission. More seriously, the understanding of the pro-
gress of an SEC inquiry that would flow from knowledge of
which persons had received subpoenas would enable an unscru-
pulous target to destroy or alter documents, intimidate wit-
nesses, or transfer securities or funds so that they could not be
reached by the Government. 56
There are several weak links in this "parade of horribles" 157 envi-
sioned by the Court. First, these concerns assume that every target, or at
least a significant number of SEC investigative targets, are unscrupulous
and would therefore engage in tactics, such as witness intimidation,
which would undermine the integrity of the investigative and quasi-judi-
cial proceedings Congress has established. The Court's fears reflect a
belief that the target has probably committed the securities laws viola-
tions that form the basis of the SEC's administrative investigation. Why
else would the target take steps to resist the SEC's investigation?
The Court apparently believes that all targets will undertake dila-
tory measures. However, the Court's position assumes that all targets
who take measures to resist an SEC investigation do so for dilatory pur-
poses and not from legitimate motives, such as a good faith belief that
such measures are needed to curb excesses of the SEC staff's delegated
authority or a good faith belief that the target's rights, such as the attor-
ney-client privilege, are being invaded by the SEC's investigative efforts.
The Court's obsessive concern with potential delay and obstruction-
ist tactics in which a target could engage overlooks an analogy to the
discovery process in civil litigation, where this same concern poses a sim-
ilar threat to the ability of the opposing party to conduct proper discov-
ery. In civil discovery, however, the approach to these concerns is not to
deny the litigants notice of pending discovery requests, but is to presume
that all parties will act properly to facilitate the progress of each side's
discovery efforts, and to impose sanctions on those parties that do not.
The Court's single-minded focus on its belief that SEC investigative
targets will act improperly if they receive notice of third party subpoenas
seems to give undue deference to the conclusion that the target is guilty
of the suspected securities laws violations that are under investigation.
However, the analogy to civil discovery helps to put matters back in
proper focus: (1) by entitling the target to a presumption of innocence
until proven guilty, and (2) by the derivative proposition that the target is
entitled to a presumption that he will act in good faith until such time
156. 104 S. Ct. at 2730 (footnote omitted).
157. This phrase was borrowed from Respondent's Brief, O'Brien, supra note 88, at 42-49.
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that the target's conduct warrants the opposite conclusion.158
The Court's concern also misapprehends the implications of the no-
tice requirement. The target does not obtain by way of notice any greater
right to challenge the subpoena. Rather, the target is simply made aware
of the opportunity to challenge the validity of the SEC's administrative
subpoena on whatever grounds may otherwise exist to attack the third
party subpoena, including the ground that the SEC has failed to comply
with the Powell standards.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in O'Brien did not involve any expan-
sion of the rights of targets of SEC administrative investigations to chal-
lenge SEC subpoenas. The court of appeal's ruling would have ensured
that every target had notice of the opportunity to protect his or her right
to be investigated in accordance with the Powell standards. However, the
Supreme Court's ruling in O'Brien has created an inequality of rights
among SEC administrative targets. The effect of the Supreme Court's
ruling is to deny to certain targets notice of the opportunity to challenge
third party subpoenas, while at the same time permitting this opportu-
nity to those targets who are fortunate enough to receive informal notice
of the SEC's third party subpoenas. As it stands now, the SEC adminis-
trative target is entitled to assert its Powell rights only in those situations
where the target somehow receives informal notice, generally from a
third party recipient of an administrative summons. Moreover, all of the
Court's concerns and assumptions regarding the target's possible dilatory
tactics apply with equal force to the situation where the target receives
"informal" notice. The obvious question is: Why did the Court deny a
notice requirement to all targets, thereby creating a situation in which
certain SEC administrative targets will have the opportunity to challenge
an SEC third party subpoena while other SEC targets will be denied this
opportunity?
The answer may lie in the actual, unarticulated justification for the
result reached by the unanimous O'Brien Court. The law that has grown
up around the Powell requirements purportedly applies to determine the
validity of any federal agency's administrative subpoena.1 59 However,
not all federal agency investigations are alike."6 The scope of statutorily
delegated investigative power may differ as well as the uses to which the
investigative results may be put. For example, certain agencies may be
empowered to investigate all suspected violations of laws within their ju-
158. See infra text accompanying notes 165-69.
159. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
160. See United States v. Armada Petroleum Corp., 562 F. Supp. 43, 52-53 (S.D. Tex.
1982), aft'd, 700 F.2d 706 (Emer. Ct. App. 1983).
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risdiction (IRS); other agencies may be empowered to investigate only
suspected violations of the laws administered by that agency committed
by a particular class of people. An example of the latter type of agency is
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the investigative pow-
ers of which are concerned exclusively with employers' violations of
equal employment laws.161 Additionally, the statutes may reflect differ-
ent uses for investigative data collected by the administrative agency.
For example, the IRS may institute collection proceedings,162 while the
EEOC may institute legal action to eliminate employment
discrimination.
163
These varying degrees of congressional limitations on agencies' in-
vestigative authority reflect the different policy objectives each agency is
authorized to pursue." In light of the varying policy objectives, the
Supreme Court in O'Brien may have been unwilling to impose a notice
requirement across the board on the multitude of federal agencies by en-
grafting a notice requirement onto that body of common law known as
the "law of administrative subpoenas." Instead, the Court may have
been persuaded that the decision to impose such a notice requirement on
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) provides in relevant part:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved,
or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentieship
or other training or retraining. . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice,
the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge. . . on such employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization. . . within ten days, and shall make an investiga-
tion thereof.
162. See United States v. Baggott, 103 S. Ct. 3164 (1983) (describing proper purposes of
IRS taxpayer investigations and the types of collection proceedings that may follow upon the
IRS' issuance of a formal notice that the taxpayer owes a deficiency).
163. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-50,) (1982).
164. See United States v. Bell, 564 F.2d 953 (Emer. Ct. App. 1977), wherein the target of a
Federal Energy Administration (FEA) investigation contended that the Powell standards
should be applied to require the FEA to show not only (1) that the investigation was
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose and (2) that the inquiry was relevant to
that purpose, but also (3) that the FEA does not already possess the information and
(4) that the required administrative steps have been followed. To require these two
additional elements of proof would restrict the broad and necessary powers of en-
forcement conferred on the FEA by Congress and the President under the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act and Federal Energy Administration Act. There is a
critical difference between the procedures necessary for obtaining essential facts for
enforcing the Allocation Act and obtaining such facts for enforcing the Internal Rev-
enue Code. Under the latter, annual statements (tax returns) are required to furnish
the information. Indeed, application here of the very different Internal Revenue
Code enforcement procedures would defeat the Congressional call for "prompt ac-
tion by the Executive Branch of Government" in Section 2(a) of the Allocation Act
in achieving a goal of the Act.
Id. at 959. See also In re EEOC, 709 F.2d 392, 398 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983) ("the real point is that
principles established in tax cases, and mostly notably in [Powell] cannot be indiscriminately
applied to other agencies.").
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a particular federal administrative agency must depend on the purpose
for which that agency was given its investigative power. This approach
necessitates a separate examination of each federal agency's investigative
powers within the context of the statutes creating that administrative
agency. Although the Court's unwillingness to adopt a notice require-
ment that, with little difficulty, could potentially extend to all federal
administrative agencies is quite understandable, the reasoning employed
by the Court further masks this unarticulated concern and adds unneces-
sary confusion and uncertainty to the law of administrative subpoenas.
Whatever policy reasons may exist to defeat imposition of a notice
requirement as part of other agencies' administrative investigations, they
do not apply to SEC administrative investigations. Consistent with the
paramount statutory goal of investor protection, and in order to promote
the proper balance between the conflicting interests of the SEC and the
target, imposition of a notice requirement is warranted.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE TARGET AND THE
SEC
A statutory solution to this notice problem may be designed that
provides a more equitable balance between the competing interests of the
SEC and its administrative targets than the solution provided by the
Supreme Court's ruling in O'Brien.
A. A Statute Providing for Notice to the Target is Sufficient to
Mitigate the Harm to the Target
Notice to the target of all third party subpoenas permits the target
the opportunity to invoke previously existing rights with respect to the
validity of the SEC subpoena. Notice does not enlarge the scope of these
pre-existing rights.165 The bases on which the target can challenge the
SEC's third party subpoena include the alleged failure of the subpoena to
165. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 644 F.2d 953, 956-57 (2d Cir. 1981) (court
noted that I.R.C. § 7609 did not create any new substantive rights on behalf of targets of IRS
administrative investigations); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302,
306 (3d Cir. 1981) (The provisions of § 7609 "did not enlarge the substantive grounds on
which a taxpayer could resist enforcement [of an IRS third party subpoena]."). However,
enactment of the notice requirement in § 7609 has not been interpreted by the courts as abol-
ishing the rights created under Reisman and Powell. United States v. Berg, 636 F.2d 203, 205
(8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Island Trade Exch., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 993, 996 (E.D. N.Y.
1982) In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 688 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[W]e think it clear
that section 7609(0 does not enlarge or contract the substantive rights to enforcement already
available to the taxpayer.").
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comply with the Powell standards, 166 as well as any claims of privilege,
trade secret or confidentiality that the target may hold.167  No other
rights are involved.
Providing notice does not mean that a target is entitled to be present
at a requested deposition or document production. Thus, any proposed
statute need not get mired down in resolving issues such as the target's
right to question witnesses and lodge objections. In this manner, a notice
only requirement dispenses with many of the procedural obstacles that
the Court feared the target might erect if the target were to receive notice
of all third party subpoenas. Since the statute delineates the scope of a
target's right, further case by case treatment would not be required to
resolve those questions that were left open under the Ninth Circuit's re-
versed ruling in O'Brien.
B. This Statutory Solution is Consistent with the Objective of Investor
Protection Under the Federal Securities Law
A statutory solution balancing the competing interests of the SEC
and the target is included in APPENDIX A to this article. This proposed
statute is modeled after section 7609 of the Internal Revenue Code,
1 68
which provides for notice to a target (taxpayer) in IRS investigations
166. See supra text accompanying note 111.
167. See PepsiCo. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). In PepsiCo., the district
court held that the target was not entitled to receive notice of all third party subpoenas. The
reasoning of the district court was essentially the same as that adopted by the Supreme Court
in O'Brien. The facts of the PepsiCo. case arguably provide an even more persuasive basis on
which to base a notice requirement than do the facts of the O'Brien case. In PepsiCo. the target
of the SEC investigation, who had extensively cooperated with the SEC, requested notice of
SEC third party subpoenas issued to former employees of PepsiCo. so as to prevent the disclo-
sure of privileged or other confidential information, particularly by disgruntled former employ-
ees seeking retaliation against their former employer, who was now an SEC investigative
target.
168. Section 7609 was enacted by Congress as a response to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), wherein the Court concluded that the taxpayer
(target) of an IRS investigation had no protectable fourth amendment interest in the records
and other materials requested by the IRS third party administrative subpoena issued to the
taxpayer's bank. In response to this line of Supreme Court decisions, culminating in the Miller
decision, Congress, concerned about the effect of these decisions on the individual citizen's
right to privacy, amended the Internal Revenue Code to include § 7609. In its report on
§ 7609, Congress specifically mentioned the need to balance the competing interests of the IRS
and the administrative target:
The use of the administrative summons, including the third-party summons, is a
necessary tool for the IRS in conducting many legitimate investigations concerning
the proper determination of tax. The administration of the tax laws requires that the
Service be entitled to obtain records, etc., without an advance showing of probable
cause or other standards which usually are involved in the issuance of a search war-
rant. On the other hand, the use of this important investigative tool should not un-
reasonably infringe on the civil rights of taxpayers, including the right to privacy.
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where administrative subpoenas are issued to "third party record-keep-
ers," a defined term under section 7609.
Under the suggested legislation, the SEC must give notice to the
target of all third party summonses issued as part of the SEC's formal
investigation of the target. However, where there are legitimate con-
cerns, such as the intimidation of witnesses or the destruction of re-
quested documents, the statute contains a mechanism which protects the
targets' rights, while also permitting the SEC investigation to go forward
unimpeded.
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2897, 3203.
As originally enacted, § 7609 required the IRS to provide the taxpayer (target) with no-
tice of administrative subpoenas served on "third-party record keepers," a defined term under
§ 7609, if the third party subpoena requested production of "records made or kept of the
business transactions or affairs of any person (other than the person summoned) who is identi-
fied in the description of the records contained in the summons. . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(1)
(1982). Thus, notice of the third party subpoena is to be sent to the taxpayer (target) "as the
person relating to whose business or transactions the books or records are kept." H.R. REP.
No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2897, 3204 (footnote omitted). The taxpayer was then entitled under § 7609 to stay the
third party's compliance with the IRS third party subpoena by simply sending a letter to both
the IRS and the third party subpoena recipient. In order to obtain the third party's compli-
ance with the subpoena, the IRS was required to institute enforcement proceedings.
In 1980, Congress held hearings regarding proposed amendments to § 7609 which would
change the procedure used by a taxpayer to lodge his objections to the third party subpoena.
Under this suggested amendment, the taxpayer would be required to shoulder the burden and
expense of instituting proceedings to challenge the validity of the IRS third party subpoena, a
burden that had rested on the IRS under § 7609 as it was originally enacted. See Godwin v.
United States, 564 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 1983).
At the hearings on this proposed change to the procedures under § 7609, the IRS did not
contend that the taxpayer should not receive notice of the third party subpoena; rather, the
IRS contended that the procedure under § 7609 permitting the taxpayer an automatic stay of
enforcement of the third party subpoena was an undue administrative burden on the IRS. See
Review of Taxpayer Privacy Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm.
on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 121-22 (1980) (statement of Stephen J. Csontos,
Legislative Counsel, Tax Division, Department of Justice) ("What we [the IRS] are suggesting
is that [Congress] consider changing these procedures [under § 7609] without modifying the
basic right that [Congress] gave taxpayers in 1976."). See also id. at 107-08 (statement of
Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).
The proposed changes in § 7609 were adopted by Congress and became effective in 1982.
The IRS' position with regard to § 7609 suggests that it is not the notice requirement that is
burdensome to the government agency. As long as the taxpayer must bear the expense of
initiating proceedings to protect his right to privacy, it appears that taxpayers in general will
initiate such proceedings with far less frequency than if the statute imposes the burden of
seeking compliance on the IRS. Telephone interview with Katy Basile and Robin Holbrooke,
Disclosure Division of the IRS' Los Angeles Office (June 26, 1984 and July 3, 1984) (Ms.
Holbrooke indicated that since the amendment to § 7609, the IRS "has an easier time in get-
ting compliance [with a third party subpoena] without [the necessity of instituting] a formal
enforcement proceeding.").
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A court may excuse the SEC from complying with the statute's no-
tice requirement upon a proper, factual showing that the target is likely
to destroy the requested documents or harass a potential witness. Con-
trary to the assumptions made by the O'Brien Court, this statutory pro-
posal assumes that any efforts the target makes to resist the SEC
investigation will be made in good faith and for proper motivation. If the
SEC can demonstrate the contrary to a court, it can dispense with the
notice requirement in order that the investigation proceed apace. But in
the absence of such a showing, the target is entitled to receive notice of
all third party process served by the SEC so that he or she can protect his
or her important interests that may otherwise be negatively impacted
during the pendency of the SEC's investigation. 16 9
The scheme of this statutory solution is consistent with the para-
mount objective of the federal securities laws: protection of the investing
public. Affording notice to the investigative target of third party admin-
istrative process does no violence to the statutory goal of investor protec-
tion, absent a showing of the likelihood that the target will engage in
dilatory or obstructionist tactics. On such a showing, however, the SEC
is excused from compliance with the notice requirement, consistent with
the objective that the SEC be permitted to conduct its investigation in a
prompt fashion for the protection of investors.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's O'Brien decision generates considerable confu-
sion with respect to the proper application of the Court's earlier decisions
in Powell and Reisman, and casts doubt on the continuing validity of the
Powell criteria. It appears that, unless the Powell standards are eventu-
ally to be done away with by the Court,17 those targets, who are fortu-
169. The administrative burden in the form of the cost of mailing a copy of the SEC third
party subpoena to the target is not overwhelming, especially when balanced against the target's
interests, and therefore, is not an onerous burden to place on the SEC.
170. Some future case obviously will require the Court to address the purpose for which the
Powell standards were created. Such a case will require the Court to address the need for
standards which assure that judicial process is not being abused by the enforcement of admin-
istrative subpoenas. This topic lies outside the scope of this article, which deals with the
question of whether a target should receive notice of the SEC's third party administrative
subpoenas. As part of this discussion, however, the author has assumed the validity of the
Supreme Court's long-standing Powell decision as the basis for determining the validity of any
subpoena issued by the SEC during the course of the SEC's administrative investigation. The
focus of this article has been to identify the competing concerns of the SEC and administrative
targets that surface in connection with the decision to impose a notice requirement. Future
litigation, likely to be instituted by SEC administrative targets who have received informal
notice of the SEC's third party subpoenas, will have to deal with the underlying question of
19851
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
nate enough to receive informal notice of the issuance of an SEC third
party subpoena, will be afforded the opportunity to intervene and chal-
lenge this subpoena for failure to satisfy the Powell criteria. But with
respect to those targets who do not receive informal notice, the Court's
ruling results in unequal treatment because these targets will be wholly
unaware of the opportunity to assert the SEC's failure to satisfy the Pow-
ell standards. This unequal treatment of SEC administrative targets is
one of the most unsettling aspects of the Court's opinion in O'Brien be-
cause the conflicting interests which prompted the targets in O'Brien to
seek notice are not resolved, but rather are exacerbated by the Supreme
Court decision. Therefore, a legislative approach to the problem is
required.
APPENDIX A-PROPOSED STATUTE
Special Procedures for Third Party Summonses
(a) Notice.
(1) In General. If any summons described in subsection (b) is
served on any person and the summons requires the production of
any portion of records made or kept of the business transactions or
affairs of any person (other than the person summoned) who is iden-
tified in the description of the records contained in the summons,
then notice of the summons shall be given to any person so identi-
fied within three days of the day on which such service is made.
Such notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the summons which
has been served.
(2) Sufficiency of Notice. Such notice shall be sufficient if, on or
before such third day, such notice is served in the manner provided
in section - [relating to service of summons] upon the person enti-
tled to notice, or is served upon the person entitled to notice in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section - [relating to procedures
for service by mail] and a proof of service by mail is prepared in
accordance with the procedures of section - [relating to prepara-
tion of proof of service of notice by mail].
(3) Exceptions. Paragraph (1) of this subdivision shall not apply
to any summons
(A) served on a person who is identified in the caption of that
formal order of investigation pursuant to which the summons
is issued; or
whether the Powell standards, or any standards, should be applied to determine the validity of
administrative subpoenas.
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(B) issued to determine whether or not records of the busi-
ness transactions or affairs of an identified person have been
made or kept; or
(C) described in subsection (d).
(4) Nature of Summons. Any summons to which this subsection
applies shall identify the person to whom the requested records per-
tain and shall provide such other information as will enable the per-
son summoned to locate the records required to be produced under
the summons.
(b) Summons to Which This Section Applies.
(1) In General. A summons is described in this subsection if it is
issued under: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1982); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1982); Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1982);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1982); or In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(b) (1982).
(2) Records and Certain Related Testimony. For purposes of this
section
(A) the term "records" includes books, papers, or other data;
(B) a summons requiring the giving of testimony relating to
records shall be treated as a summons requiring the production
of such records; and
(C) a summons requiring the giving of testimony relating to
the business transactions or other affairs of the person who is
identified in the description contained in the summons shall be
treated as a summons requiring the production of such records.
(c) Restriction on Examination of Records. No examination of any
records or any person required to be produced under a summons as to
which notice is required under subsection (a) may be made before the
close of the twenty-third day after the day notice with respect to the
summons is given in the manner provided in subsection (a)(2).
(d) Additional Requirement in the Case of a John Doe Summons. Any
summons described in subsection (b) which is issued pursuant to a for-
mal order of investigation which does not identify the party or parties
under investigation may be served only after a district court proceeding
in which the Securities Exchange Commission (the Commission) estab-
lishes that
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person
or ascertainable group or class of persons;
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or
1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
group or class of persons may fail or may have failed to comply with
any provision of the federal securities laws; and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of
the records (including the identity of the particular person or group
or class of persons who are the subject of the Commission's investi-
gation) is not readily available from other sources.
(e) Special Exception for Certain Summonses. In the case of any sum-
mons described in subsection (b), the provisions of subsection (a)(1) shall
not apply if, upon petition by the Commission, the district court deter-
mines that
(1) the investigation being conducted is within the lawful jurisdic-
tion of the Commission;
(2) there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to
a legitimate administrative investigation; and
(3) there is reason to believe that the giving of such notice will
result in
(A) endangering life or physical safety of any person;
(B) flight from prosecution;
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or offi-
cial proceeding or unduly delaying a trial or ongoing official
proceeding to the same extent as the circumstances in the pre-
ceding subparagraphs.
An application made pursuant to this subsection must be made with
reasonable specificity.
(f) Jurisdiction of District Court; etc.
(1) Jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the district
within which the person to be summoned resides or is found shall
have jurisdiction to hear any proceeding brought under subsection
(d) or (e). An order denying the petition shall be deemed a final
order which may be appealed.
(2) Special Rule for Proceedings Under Subsection (d) or (e). The
determinations required to be made under subsections (d) and (e)
shall be made ex parte and shall be made solely on the petition and
supporting affidavits.
(3) Priority. Except as to cases the court considers of greater im-
portance, a proceeding brought for the enforcement of any sum-
mons, or a proceeding under subsections (d) and (e) of this section,
and appeals, takes precedence on the docket over all other cases and
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shall be assigned for hearing and decided at the earliest practicable
date.
(g) Sanctions.
(1) If the person to whom the required records pertain, upon re-
ceipt of such notice as is required under subsection (a), seeks to in-
tervene in any proceeding instituted by the Commission to enforce
such third party subpoena, or otherwise seeks to restrain compliance
with the Commission's administrative subpoena and the district
court determines that any such actions taken by such person were
taken without good cause or substantial justification, the district
court shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions
payable to the Commission. This power shall not apply to advocacy
of counsel before the district court. For purposes of this subsection
only, the term "person to whom the required records pertain" in-
cludes such person or such person's attorney or both.
(2) Sanctions pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except
on notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers, or on
the district court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be
heard.
(3) An order imposing sanctions pursuant~to this section shall be
in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances
justifying the order.
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